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Abstract
With its ratification in 1995 the World Trade Organization’s agreement on ”Trade Re-
lated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights” (TRIPS) advances minimum global patent
protection. Particularly in view of access to essential medicines the TRIPS agreement
permits countries to overwrite patent exclusivity in isolated cases and compulsory license
a domestic manufacturer. Subsequently, export of compulsory licensed drugs was autho-
rized to account for the lack in appropriate drug production capabilities of least developed
countries. So far, this cross border compulsory licensing was used only once, in contrast to
numerous domestic utilizations. While literature highlights political pressure and threads
to foreign direct investment as general barriers for compulsory licensing the question re-
mains why only least developed countries do not make use of this instrument. The work
at hand contributes to the debate by identifying a discrimination of least developed coun-
tries which roots in the mechanics induced by the compulsory licensing process itself. A
private generic manufacturer would not sell a compulsory licensed drug at marginal costs
but determine the optimal duopoly competition price for a given structure of demand.
Since potential licensees apply for compulsory licensing the optimal price is overwritten
by negotiations and usually reduced significantly. This does not hold for least developed
countries seeking cross border compulsory licensing because the sequence of price bids and
decision is different. As a result, cross border compulsory licensing loses its appeal, further
reduced by royalty and transportation cost effects on the generic price.
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1. Introduction
The work at hand contributes to the economic evaluation of pharmaceutical patent
protection in the developing world. It does not attempt to analyze the trade-off
between incentives for research and access to medicines. Without taking sides in
this serious problem we look at the current situation of global intellectual property
rights as mandated by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and at the national
implementation. We investigate the induced mechanics and find that the current
system discriminates least developed countries unintentionally.
The focus lies on a derogation conceded to developing countries by the WTO in
the agreement on ”Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights” (TRIPS),
compulsory licensing (CL). Generally, the TRIPS agreement from 1995 establishes
minimum patent protection of 20 years for member countries. The CL derogation
allows governments to license generic manufacturers for production and marketing of
a patented drug without authorization of the right holder. Advocates of compulsory
licensing argue that developing countries need this measure to increase accessibility to
drugs in the fight against diseases highly prevalent in the poor population, especially
those which are communicable. Compulsory licensing in its form today is the result of
negotiations and concessions on the way to global patent protection, but the topic is
underrepresented in economic literature. While it is not possible to ultimately assess
1
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the impact of wide compulsory licensing usage by preventing patent protection on
access and innovation, this thesis draws conclusions based on the mechanics induced.
The analysis points out that compulsory licensing is most likely to be issued for drugs
addressing neglected diseases and thus jeopardizes any positive effect on innovation
regarding these diseases that global patent protection could have had. This leads
to a situation in which developing countries accept patent protection for drugs on
which they could free-ride on innovation while undermining it for diseases that only
they can set incentives for.
Most importantly, the findings challenge the perception that the compulsory licens-
ing derogation predominantly aids the most deserving countries. In fact, they sug-
gest that least developed countries (LDC) are discriminated compared to developing
countries with domestic manufacturing capabilities unintentionally. Since the WTO
Doha Declaration in 2001 countries are allowed to export CL drugs to LDC without
appropriate drug manufacturing capabilities. Our findings explain why such cross
border compulsory licensing (CBCL) is virtually non-existent at the time.
All chapters of this thesis are connected and the findings from a preceding chapter
feed the analysis in the following.
1.1. Structure and Literature
In order to draw the conclusion described above a first step is to outline the legal
framework and assess compulsory licensing utilization in chapter 2. Subsequently,
chapter 3 examines the static duopoly that unfolds from compulsory licensing to then
look at dynamic aspects of patents in chapter 4 and price negotiations in chapter
5. For the pig picture chapter 6 analyses how the findings from chapters 3, 4 and
2
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5 unfold in the context of an open economy. The conclusions are summarized in
chapter 7.
Chapter 2 begins with a brief introduction to the evolution of international intel-
lectual property legislation and outlines the patent relevant parts of the so called
”TRIPS” agreement, implemented in 1995. The focus lies on the compulsory li-
censing instrument, with it’s scope expanded to cross border compulsory licensing
(CBCL) by the Doha Declaration in 2001. A number of examples demonstrate
how these compulsory licenses unfold in detail and the sole CBCL episode demon-
strates how cumbersome the respective process is. A complemented and validated
assessment of compulsory licensing by Beall and Kuhn (2012b) shows that between
2000 and 2012 a total number of 43 episodes occurred of which only five are re-
lated to low-income economies. These 43 episodes with an actual employment of 25
compulsory licenses oppose the perception that compulsory licensing is rarely used.
However, low-income economies seem to flinch from using it, even though cross bor-
der compulsory licensing was introduced by the Doha Declaration. In particular the
time consuming registration process as well as the requirement to early identify is
described as aggravating even though it remains unclear why these prevent cross
border compulsory licensing compared to domestic compulsory licensing.
In order to approach the question why low-income countries might be discriminated
by the instrument of compulsory licensing a first step is to fade out any complexities
related to dynamics or open economies, but to focus on the static closed economy
impact of issuing compulsory licensing. Chapter 3 explains that in the resulting
duopoly situation the innovator’s quality advantage as well as the domestic generic
manufacturer’s distribution network advantage prevent pricing at production costs
and allow both to keep profits. The analysis is substantiated by Chaudhuri, Gold-
berg, and Jia (2003) and Flynn, Hollis, and Palmedo (2009). A simplified model
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based on Hotelling (1929) product differentiation also demonstrates how the lever-
age of these marketing advantages change in the socioeconomic properties of the
drug’s targeted indication. While for global diseases such as diabetes the innovator’s
quality advantage could partially prevent generic erosion, compulsory licensing for
diseases that predominantly affect the poor population in rural areas will signifi-
cantly expand access. With regard to remuneration section 3.3 demonstrates that
for a majority of compulsory licenses a small royalty based on the generic’s net sales
was applied. Since this royalty is usually small the economic literature dismisses it
as having a negligible effect on the generic’s price. Yet, in the competition scenario
the royalty’s effect on generic prices might be amplified my the competition on top
of the production costs.
In chapter 4 we discuss the dynamics of patent protection following Arrow (1962)
and outline a number of inefficiencies in particular with regard to pharmaceutical
research and development based on Tirole (1988), Scherer (2007) and Heller and
Eisenberg (1998). The second part of chapter 4 provides an overview of selected
alternatives and auxiliary mechanisms, namely Patent Buyouts (Kremer (1998)),
Health Impact Fund (Hollis and Pogge (2008)) and Advanced Market Commitments
(Kremer (2001)).
Subsequently, chapter 5 presents a negotiation game that demonstrates how the
threat of compulsory licensing could reduce the innovator’s pricing without employ-
ing it. This model also helps to understand that governments are especially likely
to consider and issue compulsory licenses for drugs that target diseases predomi-
nantly affecting the poor population in rural areas. Neglected diseases accordingly
suffer another uncertainty from the innovator’s research allocation perspective. Most
importantly, the model shows that a generic competitor will reduce pricing in the
process of convincing the government of compulsory licensing if there are indirect
4
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costs to it in the form of political pressure or the risk of jeopardizing foreign direct
investment.
As chapter 6 explains this holds only for countries that have domestic generic manu-
facturers. Low-income economies dependent on drug imports do not have that price
reducing advantage due to the cumbersome cross border compulsory licensing pro-
cess. By opening the tedious application process for possible licensees these countries
have already committed to compulsory licensing. Any indirect costs of issuing com-
pulsory licensing vanish in the application process as they are sunk costs. The foreign
generic competitor does not have to worry about undercutting a given threshold to
convince the low-income economy of compulsory licensing. Further, the exporting
country is obligated to issue compulsory licensing as well, which limits the number
of eligible licensees, if any. Accordingly, the licensee will set the optimal duopoly
price, which is either higher than or equals the price a domestic applicant would
apply with. Additionally, cross border compulsory licensing involves transportation
costs that add to production costs. Not only does this directly increase the licensees
pricing, the effect of a royalty on the generic price will increase as well. Chapter 7
summarizes the results, discusses weaknesses of the analysis and suggests starting
points for further research.
In the economic literature, among others, Kremer (2002) and Tirole (2006) address
the access to medications in developing countries in a general way. Kremer (2002)
gives the reader a broad outline of the problems impairing the supply of pharma-
ceuticals to the poor population. Among other subjects, he addresses the lack of
research and development (R&D) coverage for neglected diseases and depicts policy
options. Kremer (2001) also explores the idea of purchasing funds and goes into
detail with the structure of purchase commitments and proposes a pricing mech-
anism. Tirole (2006) picks up the recent development in international intellectual
5
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property rights, namely the TRIPS agreement and in particular the compulsory li-
censing instrument. His conclusions leave the reader with a pessimistic perspective.
He criticizes, among other things, the lack of rules for issuing compulsory licensing
and thus accompanies Kremer (2002) that ”governments face free-rider problems
in supplying the global public good of R&D and have time-inconsistent preferences
regarding rewarding firms for doing so” (Kremer (2002), p. 69). There are many
other contributions to the discussion on the question of how TRIPS will effect the
accessibility to medications in developing countries. To name but a few Bird (2009),
Reichman (2009) and Lybecker and Fowler (2009) evaluate the options from a legal
perspective. Flynn, Hollis, and Palmedo (2009), Pradhan (2006), Grace (2004) and
Lalitha (2009) analyze economic and welfare effects in a general way, but only few
apply a quantitative approach. The market for essential drugs in developing coun-
tries was estimated by Goodman et al. (2009) and Chaudhuri, Goldberg, and Jia
(2003), whereas the latter link it with TRIPS and simulate patent protection while
not incorporating compulsory licensing. Importantly, Beall and Kuhn (2012b) con-
duct an analysis of media databases, assess numerous compulsory licensing episodes
and challenge the perception that compulsory licensing is not used often. Kyle and
McGahan (2011) analyze the investment in pharmaceuticals before and after TRIPS
and find that the anticipated effect of higher R&D does not hold for countries with
low income. With certainty this result is partly due to the low potential of develop-
ing countries to recoup high R&D. Although not considered by the authors, it is not
so far off that the uncertainty induced by compulsory licensing ruins any remaining
incentive for R&D as depicted by Tirole (2006). Kyle and McGahan (2011) suggest
that alternative mechanisms to induce R&D for NDs are required.
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1.2. Diseases Predominantly Affecting the Poor
A segmentation and categorization of diseases and drugs is difficult and can only
be done with regard to specific questions. For example the Anatomical Therapeutic
Chemical Classification System classifies drugs based on the organ or system targeted
by the respective mechanisms of action as well as therapeutic or chemical charac-
teristics. This system is controlled by the World Health Organization (WHO) Col-
laborating Center for Drug Statistics Methodology (WHOCC) and ”recommended
by the WHO for drug utilization studies” (WHOCC (2012), preface). In parallel,
other systems such as the International Classification of Diseases, Classification of
Functioning, Disability and Health or Classification of Health Interventions are uti-
lized based on a problem setting at hand. While the above systems are very complex
and consist of hundreds of subclasses other segmentations are more general and sim-
plistic. For instance communicable, high burden, contagious or tropical diseases are
segmentations serving distinct analytical questions and are based on different disease
characteristics.
For the purpose of this work we look at the group of diseases for which relative to
the burden of disease the private investment in research and development (R&D) is
relatively low. We give this group an abstract definition in order to avoid confusion
about time inconsistent and institutional diverse definitions for example with regard
to neglected tropical diseases, also referred to as neglected infectious diseases. In
reference to the low incentives we define the diseases lacking private investment as to
affect predominantly the poor population in developing countries. While Human Im-
munodeficiency Virus (HIV), Malaria as well as tuberculosis are often not considered
as neglected diseases due to considerable public investment we consider them as ND
since ”private investment as been far lower than might have been hoped, given the
7
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Figure 1.1.: Definition of neglected diseases as a filter applied in the G-Finder reports.
Picture taken from Moran et al. (2012) p.14.
massive human toll of these diseases, particularly in the poorest countries” (citation
from Batson and Ainsworth (2001)). While such a group is not often used in public
or academic discussion it mirrors the organizational structure of the WHO. An im-
portant group in the WHO headquarters organizational structure is the ”HIV/AIDS,
TB, Malaria and Neglected Tropical Diseases (HTM)” department, striving to in-
crease investment and encourage new treatment solutions for the respective diseases.
We henceforth refer to this group as the neglected diseases (ND). With this defini-
tion we follow rare economic literature such as Tirole (2006) as well as the so called
G-Finder surveys. These Reports are sponsored by the ”Bill & Melinda Gates Foun-
dation”, namely the report on Neglected Disease Research and Development: A Five
Year Review (Moran et al. (2012)) and taken on by the Global Report for Research
on Infectious Diseases of Poverty (World Health Organization (2012)). Figure 1.1
depicts the concept of which diseases are included in the group of ND.
8
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Figure 1.2.: Allocations of R&D for ne-
glected diseases 2010 from
World Health Organization
(2012), p.131.
The resulting 31 NDs can be split into
3 tiers according to their relative fund-
ing. While the top tier group consisting
of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria
each received approximately one-third
to one-fifth of total ND funding in 2010
(figure 1.2), the third tier diseases each
received less than 0.5%.
By 2011 64% of global NDs R&D fund-
ing came from the public sector, 19%
from philanthropic contributers and 17%
from phramaceutical industry (Moran et
al. (2012) p. 11). The research funding from the pharmaceutical industry is entirely
internal (intramural) meaning that the developed drugs are potentially under patent
protection (World Health Organization (2012), p 128). Moran et al. (2012) report a
decreasing trend for public and philantrophic funding following the global financial
crisis while private investments increased dramatically, yet mainly allocated in trails
for dengue vaccines. Further, the survey identifies a trend of decreasing investment
in the top tier diseases and increasing investment in second tier over five years as
figure 1.3 demonstrates.
The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) causes the Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) and is mainly transmitted via sexual interaction, injection of drugs
or children infected by their mother’s blood. The UNAIDS Report on the global AIDS
epidemic 2012 (United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (2012)) reports a steady
decline in new infections globally while at the same time more than 60% of people
invected with HIV received live saving treatment which reduced the death due to
9
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Figure 1.3.: Neglected diseases funding development by tiers. Graph taken from Moran
et al. (2012). p.25.
aids significantly between 2000 and 2011.
While Moran et al. (2012) report that an effective vaccine against HIV/AIDS is
still many years away due to rapid virus mutation, combinations of antiretroviral
(ARV) medication are administered to decrease the probability of AIDS progression
and risk of death. However, even these require additional R&D as they are not
adapted to the need of developing countries, ”for instance, paediatric formulations
and fixed-dose combinations are needed” (Moran et al. (2012), p. 26). While research
funding for HIV/AIDS is highest among all neglected diseases, this is the case due
to significant public donations only. Only a small portion of it comes from private
R&D investments. Additionally, figure 1.4 shows that HIV/AIDS funding decreases
since 2008.
If not treated malaria can lead to death especially for pregnant woman and young
children. The severe form plasmodium falciparum is most effectively treated with
10
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Figure 1.4.: HIV/AIDS R&D funding by funder types 2007-2011. Graph from Moran
et al. (2012). p.25.
so called artemisinins. In the standard therapy these are combined with other anti
malaria compounds to reduce the risk of the virus to develop a resistance to the single
drug. However, emerging virus resistances to this artemisinin-combination therapy
as well as mosquito insecticides used for vector control require further R&D efforts
(Moran et al. (2012), p. 30). A glimmer of hope emerges due to a vaccine candidate
already in phase III trials RTS,S to cut the risk malaria infection in half.
The bacterial infectious disease tuberculosis affects predominantly the lung and is in
particular lethal for patients infected with HIV/AIDs. Current treatment requires
the administration of multiple drugs over up to 24 month often co-administered with
ARV therapies. The resulting low compliance and emerging drug resistances high-
light the high need for new drugs to be efficient, quicker and simpler in treatment as
well as safely co-administered with ARV therapies fighting HIV/AIDs. Additionally,
11
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there is a strong need for cheap, rapid, accurate and easy diagnostics tailored for the
needs of developing countries as well as a new vaccine to displace an outdated one
(Moran et al. (2012), pp. 34).
Dengue fever transmitted by mosquitoes and in particular dangerous for children.
Currently there is neither a curative drug nor a preventive vaccine available. Dengue
differs from other neglected diseases since it has at least some commercial value for
private investors to develop drugs for travelers, military and mid-income countries
in Asia and South America as figure 1.5 demonstrates (Moran et al. (2012), p. 39).
Figure 1.5.: Dengue R&D funding by funder types 2007-2011. Graph from Moran et al.
(2012). p.42.
While there are 27 more diseases all of these require additional R&D efforts either in
general or to tailor treatment for developing countries. These diseases are neglected
since they do not motivate enough R&D from private investors in relation to the
burden of disease and affect mainly the poor population. Chapter 4 briefly outlines
how expected return of investments as induced by a patent system incentivizes inno-
12
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vation. The expected revenue from selling a medication for a ND is not high enough
to motivate large R&D cost.
The World Health Organization (WHO) stated in 2001, that there is ”substantial
level of R&D activity underway” for several infectious diseases (World Health Or-
ganization and International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and As-
sosiations (2001) p. 1.), especially malaria and tuberculosis. By 2010 the situation
has improved slightly and the WHO’s goal with regard to ND shifted towards in-
creasing the production of generic pharmaceuticals. However, more research for
new medicines remains an important factor as the above examples explain. Ad-
ditionally, existing medications require alternations and improvements to meet the
needs in developing countries. For some diseases accessibility and treatment is very
difficult due to serious side effects or the need of multiple administrations (World
Health Organization and International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
and Assosiations (2001) pp. 7-8). The underdeveloped infrastructure of developing
countries hinders an effective distribution of essential drugs. For example, the second
line antiretroviral Kaletra by Abbott is such an improvement especially suited for
developing countries. Contrary to its earlier version it does not ”require refrigera-
tion” or has to be taken with food. Such improvements can also be considered as
”neglected” and especially for vaccines this proves to be a serious problem (Charlish
(2011) p. 19).
The compulsory licensing episodes depicted in the coming chapter 2 mainly concern
HIV/AIDS medications, that is to say several antiretroviral drugs.
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2. TRIPS Agreement and Flexibilities
All beginnings are difficult and it is vital to challenge and review information as a
first step of research. All too often the literature perceives the so called compulsory
licensing as a neglected instrument. This chapter demonstrates that in fact it is
frequently used and points out that cross border compulsory licensing is the critical
element to be investigated. Auxiliary, we outline global patent protection and detail
the evolution as well as selected applications of compulsory licensing. Before turning
towards the economical static, dynamic and open economy aspects of compulsory
licensing it is important to explore the context of this instrument.
Intellectual property rights (IPR) are an abstract concept. They do not apply to
concrete objects but aim to reward an intellectual creation and express moral ac-
knowledgment. According to the World Intellectual Property Organization (2004)
the two branches of ”industrial property” and ”copyright” are distinguished tra-
ditionally. While the latter covers literary, artistic and scientific works, industrial
property envelopes industrial designs, trademarks and inventions. These inventions
can be described as a new solution to a specific technical problem and are subject
to requirements such as applicability as well as novelty. They are acknowledged by
means of patents in an IPR framework. Essentially, a patent is a document proving
the government’s recognition, describing it in an disclosed way and, most impor-
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tantly, implying rights. It does not approve the exploration of the invention but
represents what is called the ”right to exclude” others from doing so. Such disclo-
sure of others and the right to enforce it constitutes a patent and is limited to a
period.
This chapter will begin by briefly touching the evolution of globally harmonized
IPRs and subsequently outline the legal situation and implementation to date. The
key aspects examined here are international patent protection as well as flexibility
in form of the compulsory licensing (CL) instrument. We focus on assessing the
utilization of compulsory licensing in the second part of this chapter and describe
several key compulsory licensing episode examples.
In conclusion, all WTO member countries are allowed to license a generic manufac-
turer without the right holders approval even though the respective product is under
patent protection. Investigating multiple compulsory licensing episodes shows that
price negotiations lead to discounts rather than compulsory licensing for several of
these episodes. A novel assessment of CL episodes by Beall and Kuhn (2012b) is
depicted and confirmed by several individual sources per episode. In particular, this
proves wrong a widely spread perception in literature of rare compulsory licensing
usage. Cross border compulsory licensing on the other hand is not popular and the
question remains why in detail this is the case. In order to she light on this ques-
tion the findings of this chapter serve as a base for argumentation of the upcoming
analysis.
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2.1. From Paris Convention to TRIPs
The origins of patent protection are difficult to determine as some regulations might
not have followed the intention to increase incentives for innovation. Khan (2006)
provides a comprehensive summary of the history of patents and explains how they
developed from the guild system in Europe. While at a later date British monarchs
frequently rewarded minions by granting patents, the Republic of Venice is considered
to having established the first patent legislation. Only in the seventeenth century
patents became associated with incentives entirely, even though initially restricted
by high fees. The ”‘WIPO intellectual property handbook: policy, law and use”’
(World Intellectual Property Organization (2004)) details the origins of the modern
IPRs. Following Britain, other countries such as France and Germany implemented
a patent system in the late eighteenth century, having awarded inventors directly
before. The United States also passed a patent statue in the late eighteenth century,
but with greater success than other countries. The implemented patent system was
modern and explicitly intended to promote economic growth and social welfare.
As more and more countries installed IPRs it became clear that an international
harmonization is needed. Obtaining protection for an invention in several countries
was difficult due to the diversity of systems and rules. Additionally, a delayed appli-
cation in one country after a publication in another put the recognition of novelty
at risk. The lag of international harmonization became apparent as an exhibition of
inventions in Vienna took place in 1873: Inventors hesitated to exhibit their inno-
vation out of fear to loose the status of novelty in other countries. During the same
year the Congress of Vienna for Patent Reform laid the foundation for international
negotiations to harmonize IPR which resulted in the Paris Convention treaty ten
years later (World Intellectual Property Organization 1883).
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In order to overcome this diversity the Paris Convention specified rules to harmonize
national IP legislation and in particular the ”national treatment” provision enforced
equal treatment of other member country’s nationals. Further, the ”right of priority”
regulates that a delayed application withing a given time frame will be handled as
if it happened the same day as the earliest application among the member states.
Belgium, Brazil, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Italy, the Netherlands, Portu-
gal, Serbia, Spain and Switzerland signed the agreement, even though the so called
”patent controversy” imperiled and interrupted patent protection in some European
countries. Whilst the Paris Convention covers the ”industrial property”, in 1886 an-
other treaty introduced a similar harmonization on copyright, known as the ”Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works”.
The number of signers for both treaties grew over time and was in particular boosted
after World War II. As to date, the Paris and Bern Conventions are still in force and
originated a new and broader framework established in the 20th century. This agree-
ment of ”Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights” (TRIPs, World
Trade Organization 1994) even cites the Paris and Bern Conventions while not an-
nulling them. It resulted from the Uruguay Round under the ”General Agreement of
Trades and Tariffs” (GATT), which installed the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The ”Uruguay Round” refers to the eighth GATT round, which was launched in
September 1986 in Punta del Este, Uruguay and finished on April 15, 1994 in Mar-
rakesh, Morocco. It also had other objectives, for instance to reduce agricultural
subsidies and to open service trades. The ”Trade Related Investment Measures”,
”General Agreement on Trade and Services”, ”Multilateral Agreements on Trade in
Goods” are the main outcomes of the negotiations, apart from the TRIPS agree-
ment. These agreements are ratified as an annex of the WTO agreement and came
into effect on January, 1 st 1995.
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TRIPs bounds all WTO members to minimum IPR standards and regulates the
dispute settlement of infringement as WTO jurisdiction (World Trade Organization
2006). The minimum patent protection in accordance with TRIPS numbers 20 years
for any invention and is granted for products as well as processes. In accordance
with the Paris Convention these are subject to three criteria regulated in article
27 of TRIPS, namely novelty, newness and industrial applicability. The exclusivity
granted refers to ”marketing, using, offering for sale, selling, and importing” a prod-
uct (World Trade Organization 1994, article 28), regardless of the field of technology,
place of invention or whether the product is locally produced or imported (World
Trade Organization 1994, article 27). This also demonstrates the adoption of former
GATT non-discrimination legislation in TRIPS. Countries that join the WTO after
the TRIPS Agreement are obliged to have implemented TRIPS by the beginning of
their membership (World Trade Organization 2001, page 7). For member countries,
the WTO differentiates between developed, developing and least developed coun-
tries when it comes to the schedules of implementing TRIPS. Whereas developed
countries had one year to incorporate the TRIPS rules into their legislation after the
ratification in 1995, developing countries were given until the year 2000. For least
developed countries, the original time-line of 2006 was extended untill 2016 with re-
gard to pharmaceuticals by the Doha conference (World Trade Organization (2001),
paragraph 7. and section 2.3).
Probably the most controversially discussed component in the TRIPS agreement is
the flexibility granted in view of developing countries.
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2.2. Compulsory Licensing
While enhancing patent protection on the one side, the TRIPS agreement also strives
for a balance regarding emergencies and access to essential medicines on the other.
Thus, article 31 concedes an instrument to members allowing ”other use without
authorization of the right holder”, which is typically addressed to as ”compulsory
licensing” (CL), although it additionally envelops government usage (World Trade
Organization 1994, article 31, see appendix A.3). CL is traditionally incorporated
into international IP treaties as a loophole in case of patent abuse or if the patent
is not worked sufficiently as well as generally to support public interests. The Paris
Convention also allows for compulsory licensing in Article 5A with regard to these
reasons (World Intellectual Property Organization 1883). Within the TRIPs frame-
work the legitimacy conditions of using CL are that
1. the licensee has made efforts to obtain authorization from the patent holder,
2. the duration of the licensing is limited,
3. no exclusiveness to licensee is given,
4. product is used for supply of the domestic market and
5. an adequate remuneration is payed.
Out of these, the first condition can be waived ”in the case of a national emergency
or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial
use”, and is together with the fourth non-mandatory if a judicial process determines
anticompetitive practice (World Trade Organization 1994, article 31 b and article
31 k). The determination of an adequate remuneration as well as the a national
emergency lies in the judgment of nations utilizing the instrument.
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In order to investigate some examples of compulsory licenses, it is reasonable to
distinguish between two types, domestic compulsory licensing and cross border com-
pulsory licensing (CBCL). Some few developing and middle income countries posses
a pharmaceutical industry capable of producing the respective drugs. Others, espe-
cially least developing countries, are less capable of domestic production so that the
desired drugs have to be imported.
2.2.1. Compulsory Licensing under Domestic Production
The following will depict examples of compulsory licensing episodes of developing
countries capable of producing the licensed drugs domestically. In general, issuing
of compulsory licensing is very controversial and preceded by negotiations between
government, generic petitioner and innovator. In order to underline the intensity of
compulsory licensing disputes the case of South Africa in 1997 is showcased first.
The South African controversy gained much attention internationally and especially
shifted the political attitude with regard to TRIPs flexibilities globally as Fisher III
and Rigamonti (2005) summarize. Thereafter, episodes in Brazil and India throw a
light on exemplary processes and time lines.
South Africa considered the idea of compulsory licensing already in 1997 by intro-
ducing the ”Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment” (MRSCA) Act
No. 90 (South Africa (1997)). The Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
epidemic was rampant in South Africa with an adult prevalence rate of almost 20%.
Between the emerge of AIDS in 1981, the discovery of the ”Human Immunodeficiency
Virus” HIV in 1984 and the first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994, the
disease spreat almost unhindered. The health care system was extremely unequalt,
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with approximately 80%, mostly native South Africans, relying only on public health
care.
The antiretroviral drugs (ARV) available were still patented and like today did not
cure but decelerate the process of AIDS. As South Africa became TRIPS compliant
in 1997 with the Patents Act this treatment became very costly. The post-apartheid
government under Nelson Mandela struggled with this AIDS crisis and the MRSCA
was meant to relief the budgets by generic substitution, parallel imports, transparent
and controlled pricing as well as clearing the way for cross border compulsory licens-
ing (CBCL). The international pharmaceutical industry feared that other developing
countries might follow the South African model and 40 innovators filed a lawsuit,
challenging the MRSCA constitutionally. The U.S. Clinton administration as well as
the European Union additionally imposed pressure against the MRSCA. The United
States trade representatives pursued a so called TRIPS plus policy, which adheres
to a tighter standard than agreed in TRIPS as Ford (2000) explains. Initially, the
focus of South Africa was not on compulsory licensing but on price reduction via
transparent pricing and parallel imports, in article 15C in MRSCA (South Africa
(1997)). The controversy evolved around the interpretation of TRIPs and the U.S.
ambition to push TRIPS plus. Compulsory licensing was brought to the forefront in
the process of the international public and political debate.
A lawsuit filed by the pharmaceutical Industry turned out to be a disaster. The
international public opinion strongly supported the South African matter and in-
novators suffered a major and lasting damage to their public image. The U.S. as
well as E.U. administration withdrew the political pressure in 1999 and one by one
the companies abandoned the action. The Secretary General of the United Nations,
Kofi Annan, was asked by GlaxoSmithKline’s president Jean-Pierre Garnier to re-
solve the matter with Thabo Mbeki, at the time president of South Africa. In April
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2001 the lawsuit was settled and the MRSCA came into effect. Additionally, several
alliances fighting AIDS were founded such as the ”Accelerating Access Initiative”.
Apart from institutions like WHO and UNAIDS some international pharmaceuti-
cal corporations joined these initiatives and provided cheap antiretrovirals (ARV),
perhaps to limit the damage to public relations. Further, the Global Fund to fight
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria was established by Governments and Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), motivated by the U.N.. However, a request
for voluntary licensing of ARVs by South African generic manufacturers remained
unanswered, apart from a single licenses to Aspen Pharmacare with 15%-30% roy-
alties. As a reaction an investigation of pricing practices was filed with the South
Africal Competition Tribunal agains GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim in
September 2002 (World Health Organization 2008, page 4). Additionally, the Indian
generics manufacturere CIPLA officially requested CL for 8 ARVs, increasing the
pressure on innovators. The case was settled in April 2003 and the two companies
allowed several generic companies to produce and distribute their ARVs in the sub-
Saharan African Region for 5% royalties. Subsequently, some manufactureres such as
Boehringer Ingelheim or Roche have granted a non-assert declaration. Such confirm
that the innovater will not enforce existing patents on their ARVs in certain regions
and as a result not receive any royalties.
Brazil publicly considered to issue a CL on Merck Sharp and Dohme’s (MSD)
drug Efavirenz in 2001, according to Wetzler and Ayala (2008) and Beall and Kuhn
(2012b). As a result of the threat and negotiations, MSD agreed to give a discount of
59% as well as 65% on Indinavir, a protease inhibitor also used for the treatment of
HIV. Brazil additionally negotiated with Roche about a CL on their ARVs Nelfinavir
and succeeded in getting a 40% discount the same year. Other negotiations went
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on for a couple of years, but eventually agreements on reduced prices were signed.
Bristol-Myers Squibb, Gilead and Abbott also agreed on major discounts after being
threatened with CL.
In 2007 Brazil issued a compulsory licensing to FarManguinhos, an entity of the Os-
waldo Cruz Foundation of the Government of Brazil, for Efavirenz. The CL was used
because MSD refused to price at the same level as it did after the CL negotiations
in Thailand, which is described in the next sub section. The Brazil government set
the royalty to 1.5% even though it was recommended by activists to use the 2005
WHO/UNDP remuneration guidelines, or establishing a prize fund (Love (2007)).
These guidelines are further depicted in the Ecuador case of compulsory licensing
below, as they were employed here. However, FarManguinhos was unable to produce
medication for two years due to a lag of technological knowledge and temporarly
Indian manufacturers stepped into the breach.
India issued a compulsory licensing on the cancer drug Nexavar in March 2012.
In contrast to other CL episodes this decision is well documented (Government of
India (2012)). The respective substance Sorafenig is used for advanced liver as well
as kidney cancer and extends the expectation of life by four to eight years. It was
patented and launched by Bayer corporation in India by 2008. The applicant for
compulsory licensing, Natco Pharma Limited, offered to sell the drug at a price of
Rs 8,800 ($ 180) of monthly treatment costs compared to Rs 280,428 ($ 5,600) of
the original product by Bayer. An interesting factor in this situation is that another
Indian generic manufacturer, Cipla Limited, already sold Sorafenig at monthly costs
of Rs 30,000 ($600) since May 2010. But as Bayer filed a patent infringement suit and
did import Nexavar in inadequate quantities, the compulsory licensing was issued.1
1Note that India is a member of the Paris Convention since 1998, which might me more strict with
regard to CL in certain cases. The reason for CL usage here is that Bayer did not ”sufficiently
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With the decision, the applicants price is fixed at a maximum of Rs 8,880 monthly
treatment for the respective indications and Natco is obliged to donate Sorafenig
to 600 needy patients each year. On the pricing side, the Government of India
(2012) follows the applicants proposal but adds the element of obligatory charity.
The royalty rate is set at 6% of Natco’s sales and the license is non assignable.
Futher, the sold product should not be associated with Nexavar and thus has to be
sufficiently distinct.
It is crucial to note some sequels of this decision: Initially, Natco expected sales
of five to six million U.S. dollar, according to a statement by Natco’s finance chief,
Baskara Narayana (Reuters (2012a)). The other Indian manufacturer Cipla, which
faces an infringement lawsuit by Bayer, cut the price of it’s Sorafenig. Cipla priced
at 6,840 rupees ($130), thus undercutting even Natco Pharma with Rs 8,800 ($
180) (Reuters (2012b)). For the duration of Bayer’s patent infringement suit against
Cipla this price cut will have major impact on Natco’s sales. Especially since in India
the domestic competitor’s rate of substitution is higher than with a multinational
company, according to Chaudhuri, Goldberg, and Jia (2003). Another reaction could
be interpreted as a precautional action: Roche announced to cut prices of 2 cancer
drugs by 2013, Herceptin and Mabthera. In order to avoid parallel trade these
products will also be renamed.
2.2.2. Import Compulsory Licenses
Some countries are not able to produce the desired drugs domestically and have to
rely on imports. However, the CL provision in TRIPS initially required the licensed
work” the patent for which CL may not be requested before three years have elapsed after the
patent was granted. Since Nexavar was patented in India by 2008 this criteria is met. See World
Intellectual Property Organization (1883), article 5A.
24
CHAPTER 2. TRIPS AGREEMENT AND FLEXIBILITIES
product to be used for supply of the domestic market only. In other words no TRIPS
compliant country was allowed to supply the required drugs under patent, even if
issuing a compulsory license themselves. Later, the Doha declaration included an
amendment which waived the requirement of domestic supply. These we specify as
cross border compulsory licensing (CBCL) since importing and exporting country
are required to issue CL.
Before introducing CBCL in the next section 2.3, the following will go into detail
with CL via export from India. India became TRIPS compliant with the Indian
Patent Act Amendment in 2005 (Government of India (2005)). Nonetheless, no
compulsory licensing in India was required initially: The Indian patent act regulates
that ”enterprises which have made significant investment and were producing and
marketing the concerned product prior to the 1st day of January, 2005” cannot be
subject to infringement proceedings (Government of India (2005), amendment of
section 11A, paragraph 10c). Thus, India acts as a pharmacy for the third world,
especially with regard to compulsory licensing. We denote these events as import
compulsory licenses (ICL) and differentiate them from domestic compulsory licensing
(DCL) or cross border compulsory licensing (CBCL)
Thailand announced it’s plan to issue a CL for MSD’s HIV drug Efavirenz in
November 2006 in order to have a better position for negotiations (Wetzler and
Palmedo (2008), Khor (2010), Beall and Kuhn (2012b)).
This CL without prior negotiation with the patent holder was subject to international
and domestic criticism but also found numerous support with NGO’s. A royalty fee
of 0.5% of the generics total sales was granted to MSD and distribution as well as
production of the generic drug was conducted by the Government Pharmaceutical
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Organization (GPO). It turned out that GPO was not able to produce the drug in
the desired quality. Even though the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS financially
supported the improvement of production facilities, GPO failed in securing quality
of its product. Till now, the supply of drugs is secured by a diversity of Indian drug
manufacturers.
MSD decreased its price to a level just under GPO’s but nonetheless, the Thailand’s
government adheres to the CL in order to create a precedent for a CL of other
diseases. Accordingly, Thailand issued additional compulsory licenses in 2007 on
another antiretroviral (ARV) drug Kaletra (combination of Lopinavir & Ritonavir)
from Abbott as well as on Sanofi-Aventis against hypertension. The latter has been
the first time that a developing country issued a compulsory licensing for a non ARV.
Prior to this, price reductions of the innovators for all developing countries did not
convince the Thailand government refrain from CL. As a reaction, Abbott with-
drew all its products from Thailand and planned not to introduce new medications.
The WHO pointed out that Thailand should improve its relationship with innova-
tive pharmaceutical companies as Kyle and McGahan (2011) depicts. Further, the
cancer drugs letrozole (Novartis), docetaxel (Sanofi-Aventis) and erlotinib (Roche)
compulsory licensed shortly after.
Novartis avoided a CL for Imatinib (Glivec) with the drastic decision to supply the
drug for free to households with income per year of less than 1.7 million baht via the
Glivec International Patient Assistance Programme-GIPAP.
Ecuador issued a CL in April 2010 according to Saez (2010). The drug is manu-
factured in India by the generic company Cipla and distributed within Ecuador by
Eske Group SA. The licensed drug is an ARV from Abbott Laboratories, ritonavir,
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and will be licensed until the end of patent in November 2014. Ecuador determined
the royalty by the ”Remuneration Guidelines” for Non-Voluntary Use of a Patent
on Medical Technologies (Love (2005)), which are recommended by the WHO. The
royalty structure differs from the regular CL royalties as it is not based on the gener-
ics price in the licensing country, but the innovator’s price in a high income country.
Additionally the royalty is tiered, accounting for the income per capita. The so called
”Tiered Royalty Method” is further discussed in section 3.3.
2.3. Doha Declaration
The importance of the TRIPS Agreement for public health in developing countries
was stressed by the WTO ministerial conference in Doha in 2001. With the Doha
declaration the WTO members stated to strike a balance between short term access
and long term incentives. Furthermore, an extended transition period with regard
to pharmaceutical patents for least developed countries until 2016 was agreed on
(World Trade Organization (2001) paragraphs 1-4). Developing countries other than
least developed countries had to adapt the TRIPS regulations in domestic law until
2000. Developed countries were obliged to adjust their legislation within a year if
not already in line with TRIPS (World Trade Organization (2001), page 7).
Most importantly, the ministers assigned the WTO to grant more flexibility to de-
veloping countries without the infrastructure to produce drugs on its own in light of
the fourth topic of the conditions for compulsory licensing. The WTO waives this
condition by which is usually referred to as the Doha Declaration’s paragraph 6 deci-
sion (World Trade Organization (2001), paragraph 6). Further, the WTO regulates
that remuneration should only be payed by the exporter. The waiver is planned to
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be replaced by a TRIPS amendment, approved by WTO members in 2005 during the
Hong Kong ministerial conference, but the required two thirds of the WTO members
have not yet accepted to date. The Doha round is still an ongoing negotiation also
with regard to agriculture (World Trade Organization (2005), paragraph 40).
If a developing country is not capable of producing a drug itself, compulsory licensing
can only work if the respective drug is imported. Many countries have implemented
the possibility of CL for export in their legislation but the upcoming will go into
detail with the only country that so far exported via CL: Canada.
Canada & Rwanda worked the first and only compulsory licensing so far under para-
graph 6 in 2008 for the HIV antiretroviral triple combination Zidovudine, Lamivu-
dine and Nevirapine. Prior to this, Canada implemented the ”Access to Medicines”
Regime (CAMR) in 2005 intending to supply medicines for developing countries that
issue a compulsory licensing and lack the production infrastructure. CAMR is based
on the WTO decision that drugs under compulsory licensing can be imported from
another country as regulated by the Doha declaration’s paragraph 6. This regime
served as a prototype for several equivalent legislations for example in the EU or
USA (Government of Canada (2006) Annex B). The CAMP presentation (Govern-
ment of Canada (2011)) as well as the governmental consultancy paper (Government
of Canada (2006)) give a comprehensive overview on the features and history for the
CAM regime. It shows, that under paragraph 6 and CAMR the following rules apply:
1. Importing generics from another country requires of both countries, exporting
and importing, to issue a compulsory licensing (World Trade Organization
(2003), paragraph 6).
2. CL is restricted to drugs that are listed by the WHO as essential medicines.
3. The exported products from Canada have to meet Canadian requirements in
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terms of safety, effectiveness and quality.
4. It has to be ensured that the products can be distinguished from those in the
Canadian market by coloring and labeling.
5. The exporting Canadian company is bound to pay the fees related to the
regulatory process.
6. A patent holder can challenge the compulsory license when the exported generic’s
price exceeds 25% of the Canadian original drug price. Other measures make
sure that the process is as transparent as possible.
7. The duration for the compulsory licensing is limited to 2 years.
8. Royalty rate is defined by a formula and is to be payed by the exporter.
9. The generics manufacturer has to quantify a maximum number of goods for
export.
10. A supply agreement with the importing country has to be concluded. This
agreement has to be in place before the application for compulsory licensing
prior Health Canadas Drug Review (Government of Canada (2006) pages 6-
7).
Whereas the first points are straight forward and might not surprise, the requirements
8, 9 and 10 caused some discussion and need further review.
The royalty fee is to be payed in percentage of the ”monetary value of the supply
contract” and is linked to the ”UN Human Development Index” so that ”the lowest
country on the index has to pay a royalty of approximately 0.02 percent, and the
highest 3.5 percent”(Government of Canada (2006), page 8.) This approach has been
supported by NGOs and meets the WTO TRIPS amendment to take ”into account
the economic value to the importing member” (World Trade Organization (2010),
paragraph 3).
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In order to meet condition 9, the generic manufacturer needs to know the quantity
requirements, which proved to be especially difficult with regard to developing coun-
tries. The drug manufacturer, Gilead, expressed to have had difficulties determining
future needs which is a basic criteria for compulsory licensing (Weber and Mills
(2010), page 115). The manufacturer is additionally obliged to have an agreement in
place before the compulsory licensing application. This causes a dilemma as the de-
veloping county cannot enter an agreement without knowing that the manufacturer
can deliver.
The first company using the ”paragraph 6 decision” on on domestic supply world-
wide was the Canadian generics company Apotex Inc., utilizing CAMR. Apotex won
Rwanda’s tender for the HIV antiretroviral triple combination Zidovudine, Lamivu-
dine and Nevirapine with the name ”Apo TriAvir”and shipped it in 2008 as Apotex
(2008) reports. This tender was only a charade as Apotex was the only bidder.
Apart from the above depicted requirements, which are cost intensive and time con-
suming, Apotex experienced that the greatest difficulty was to encourage developing
countries to self-identify. Weber and Mills (2010) explain that developing countries
stated that due to pressure from innovators and the world bank, they do not wish to
self identify at an early stage. Additionally, developed nations try to influence the
decision making in developeing countries. With regard to the Ecuador case depicted
below Wikileaks published an evadable leaked cable which shows that U.S. tried and
failed to organize against Ecuador compulsory licensing (Wikileaks (2009), Cable
09QUITO998 ).
Weber and Mills (2010) argue that the Apotex shipment to Rwanda would remain
the only use of paragraph 6 if not ”simplified and streamlined” as it was ”a result
of factors whose conjunction will not likely be repeated”(Weber and Mills (2010),
page 118-119). It was feared generally, that the Apotex case remained the only com-
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pulsory licensing making use of the paragraph 6 provision as the obstacles described
above seemed too strong (e.g. Kyle and McGahan (2011), Chami and Wasswa-Kintu
(2011)). The matchmaking as well as legal processes for the importing country were
heavily assisted by Me´decins Sans Frontie`res (MSF), the Clinton Foundation and
the Canadian regulatory authorities. More importantly, it was argued that the early
commitment of Apotex as well as the willingness of Rwanda to use compulsory li-
censing were necessary conditions for the one-time success.
Having described some exemplary compulsory licenses the next section will provide
a non-exclusive summary of compulsory licensing episodes, which will serve as a base
for discussion.
2.4. Utilization Assessment
Apart from the compulsory licenses depicted above there are more countries with
a compulsory licensing history. Before Beall and Kuhn (2012b) published the first
peer reviewed research on compulsory licensing episodes the literature was divided on
judging their number. Beall and Kuhn (2012b) methodically combed through several
media, academic, and legal databases by using the phrase ”(pharma! OR drug) AND
(compulsory licen!)”. Their findings serve as a basis for table A.1, augmented from
various sources.
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Table 2.1.: List of compulsory licensing episodes
The sources for the table are: a→ Beall and Kuhn (2012a)‖b→ Saez (2010)‖c→Wetzler and
Ayala (2008)‖d→Wetzler and Palmedo (2008)‖e→ Government of India (2012)‖f→World
Health Organization (2008)‖g→ Intellectual Property Watch (2007)‖h→ Government of
Ghana (2005)‖i→ Government of Zambia (2004)‖j→ Government of Malaysia (2003)‖k→
World Health Organization (2010b)‖l→ World Bank Group (2012)‖m→ Love (2004)‖n→
Baker et al. (2008)‖o→ Silverman (2012). Further details are provided in appendix A.1.
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In particular, information on royalty rates have been added and some episodes were
updated or suppressed. Further, CL events in developed countries and renewals
are not factored in, but each affected molecule is displayed in a separate row. The
details on differences to Beall and Kuhn (2012b) are given in appendix A.1. The list
is to be regarded as non-exclusive, because compulsory licensing is not obligatory
for notification to the WTO. Only CLs for exportation under paragraph six system
have to be reported and according to WTO published notifications the Rwanda &
Canada case is the only one so far. (World Trade Organization (2012)).
The collection details 43 CLs or threads in 14 countries from 2000-2012 for 20
molecules marketed by 12 corporations. Figure 2.1 displays the global number of
CLs issued by year, each counting one CL per molecule in a country. It gives a
decent count of 25 CLs issued so far and indicates the impact of this instrument,
especially taking into account voluntary licensing and discounts after a CL treat
(2.2).
Figure 2.1.: Number of issued compulsory licenses by year
Based on Table 2.1.
In the period following the TRIPS agreement on January, 1 st 1995 until 2000 no CLs
were observed (Beall and Kuhn (2012b), p. 4), since fewest countries were compliant
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Figure 2.2.: Number of compulsory licensing episodes by year
Based on Table 2.1.
with TRIPS. The first CL activities took place just before the Doha Declaration
started in 2001. 25 out of 43 episodes occurred between then and 2004, especially
with regard to ARVs.
Countries that did not have the ability to produce a desired drug domestically were
able to import. For example Ecuador, Malaysia, Thailand and Mozambique en-
trusted the drug production to Indian companies. But this happened without a CL
on the Indian side, since the Indian Patent Act of 2005 only protects new patents.
Also the spike in CL in 2004 after the Doha Declaration in August 2003 does not
result directly from the domestic production waiver, but might rather result from
the general acceptance of CL acknowledged by this conference.
Given that only Canada has undertaken a CL for export as yet, the effectiveness of
paragraph 6 system is questioned. The concerns reach from the lack of ”a straight
forward application process” to the missing ”specified formulas for calculating the
level of royalties” (Chami and Wasswa-Kintu (2011)). Additionally, the time con-
suming process for a generic manufacturer might drive potential partners off, as can
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be derived from statements by the generic manufacturer Apotex after the Canada &
Rwanda case. The debate is also about complexity of the CAMR legislation process
in Canada which is cumbersome.
The price of the Apotex product was not able to beat comparable Indian generics
(Beall and Kuhn (2012b), page 4). The regime is under discussion since the Apotex
case, but expectations of WTO are that the paragraph 6 system will be used more
frequently in the future, especially with India as the exporting country (World Trade
Organization (2010)). But the question is if the CL for export in the Indian legislation
will prove to be automatic and encourage Indian generic manufacturers to reach out
and apply for compulsory licensing.
Figure 2.3.: Compulsory licensing episodes by country type based on table 2.1.
Figure 2.3 shows the split of compulsory licensing episodes by country income group.
Striking is the dominance of upper-middle-income economies (UMIE) over low-
income economies (LIE) and lower-middle-income economies (LMIE) by the defi-
nition of World Bank Group (2012). One explanation could be the extended transi-
tion period till 2016 granted by the WTO to least developed countries for becoming
TRIPS compliant. However, Beall and Kuhn (2012b) explain that most least devel-
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oped countries implemented a TRIPS compliant legislation already before 2004 and
thus the unbalance is indeed due to a low propensity to issue CL in LMIE or LIE.
2.5. Debate Outline
During and after the TRIPS Agreement it has been a field of intense discussion re-
lated to medicines, besides others. Apart from the access to essential medicines the
TRIPS agreement was criticized with regard to ”patents on life, food security and
biopiracy” (Khor and Oh (2001)). The idea of globally harmonized IPRs was espe-
cially promoted by the United States with support from most developed countries.
Governments of developing countries as well as NGOs and many others opposed and
heavily criticized the strictness of the agreement.
Before the Doha Ministerial Conference leading NGOs stated that the ”protection of
intellectual property rights is not an end in itself”(Khor and Oh (2001)). In general,
the wealth transfer from developing countries to patent holders in the developed
world met resistance, as Henry and Stiglitz (2010) point out. With regard to phar-
maceuticals the leading critique asserts that monopolistic pricing inhibits access to
drugs especially if payed out of the consumer’s pocket.
Accordingly, the limitations on compulsory licensing in the TRIPS agreement were
and still are a point of conflict. Developing countries and NGOs argued that due to
the limitation to grand a license only to domestic manufacturers it is of no use for
countries without the capacity to produce drugs. The big concern of the pharma-
ceutical industry lies in the fear of parallel trade to developed countries.
As depicted in section 2.3 this led to an revision of the compulsory licensing instru-
ment and a waiver allowed for production in other countries. Additionally, a number
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of countries ”either agreed to opt out of using the system as importers or agreed
that they would only use the system in national emergencies or extreme urgency”
(Fergusson (2008) p. 16). The issuing country also has to install safeguards in order
to prevent the medicines to be sold in the wrong markets. But the remuneration as
well as the interpretation of the term ”national emergency” is to be determined by
the respective nations.
Still, the Doha round is an ongoing process of negotiations also with regard to
other TRIPS related topics such as agriculture. On the topic of access to patented
medicines the core discussion is on the ”balance of interests between the pharma-
ceutical companies in developed countries that held patents on medicines and the
public health needs in developing countries”(Fergusson (2008) p. 15). Yet, the re-
quired two thirds did not ratify the TRIPS amendment and thus the waiver is still
in use. The paragraph 6 of the Doha declaration has only been used once and it is
considered to be too cumbersome. Especially the ”systems notification requirements
and built-in safeguards are too costly and burdensome and represent a disincentive
for the generic supplier to produce.” However, detailed information on what exactly
hinders least developed countries from issuing compulsory licensing and to self iden-
tify remains unanswered. Suspicions are that ”attempts to use the system that were
subsequently withdrawn were because of the system itself or because of other reasons
such as prices”( World Trade Organization (2010)).
2.6. Conclusions and Outlook
As a first step on the way to analyze the effects of compulsory licensing this chapter
gives a brief overview of global intellectual property rights and in particular the
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usage of the compulsory licensing instrument. The insights from this chapter play an
important role for all the following analysis. At the center of interest are the incidence
and frequency of compulsory licenses as well the the details of the processes involved.
In order to shed light on these topics we looked into the details of several compulsory
licensing episodes and present the chronology of events for South Africa, Brazil,
India, Thailand, Equador and Rwanda. Additionally, we present an assessment of
CL episodes based on research by Beall and Kuhn (2012b), validated from additional
sources, completed by recent episodes and enriched with additional information.
TRIPS harmonizes patent protection across all members of the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO). The agreement also provides a flexibility in form of the compulsory
licensing (CL) instrument. By utilizing this measure a country is allowed to license
a domestic pharmaceutical manufacturer with the right to produce and market a
drug without approval of the right holder. This derogation is especially important
for developing countries striving to improve access to essential drugs. In order to aid
least developed countries lacking drug production capabilities the licenses are later
cleared for export. Numerous compulsory licenses within the TRIPS environment
were issued so far. Our assessment yields 43 compulsory licensing episodes, including
threats to negotiate discounts. Interestingly, the evadable neglected instrument to
improve drug access is frequently used, in particular with regard to drugs indicated
for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).
The detailed CL episodes illustrate a common pattern in the process of CL episodes.
Each starts with a threat to issue compulsory licensing which then leads to nego-
tiations between innovator and government. The innovator strives to protect its
monopoly and usually offers a discount to prevent compulsory licensing. Simulta-
neously, either a government owned manufacturer is available or a private generic
manufacturer applies for CL. The examples clearly highlight a trade-off which the
38
CHAPTER 2. TRIPS AGREEMENT AND FLEXIBILITIES
government faces. While CL virtually reduces health care costs a signal of endan-
gered intellectual property protection represents costs as well, for example losses in
foreign direct investment. A uniquely transparent Indian documentation of compul-
sory licensing negotiations between innovator, domestic generic manufacturer and
government illustrates that the decision is driven by prices and implicitly the ac-
cess width (Government of India (2012)). As a result of these considerations some
countries issue compulsory licensing and others accept the discount.
While domestic compulsory licensing is frequently utilized the so called cross border
compulsory licensing was so far applied once only. In this single case Rwanda issued
CL in order to import an HIV drug from Canada, which was obliged to issue CL
as well. The question remains why least developed countries without appropriate
manufacturing capabilities hesitate to reach out and self identify in order to ini-
tiate the process leading to cross border compulsory licensing. As a first step in
the upcoming analysis we will investigate the static duopoly that results from CL.
Another important aspect is that innovator, generic manufacturer and the govern-
ment of a respective country engage in negotiations prior to a potential CL. When
looking at these two aspects in the context of an open economy as well as least de-
veloped countries we show that they face a structural disadvantage with regard to
the negotiations. As a result CL is less beneficial.
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3. Static Impact of Compulsory
Licensing
Chapter 1 introduced the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) agreement on ”Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property” (TRIPS) and in particular explained that
countries can use the CL instrument to introduce competition to a patented drug.
Such CLs were employed frequently by developing countries, especially with regard to
medications targeting HIV, so called antiretrovirals (ARVs). In order to understand
the mechanics related to compulsory licensing the next step is to investigate the
duopoly situation, which would result from a CL. For this purpose we ignore any
dynamic effects of CL activity and assume a closed economy for now. These two
additional aspects will be explored in chapters 5 and 6, respectively.
If the government of the considered developing country issues a CL the innovator
(IV) faces competition from a generic competitor (GC). This duopoly situation can
be modeled via price competition as prices are a basic strategic element in the phar-
maceutical industry and produced quantities can easily be adjusted to the price
corresponding demand (Mu¨ller-Langer (2007), p. 17). However, plain price com-
petition and the assumption of homogeneous goods does not sufficiently reflect the
situation. It is not realistic to assume that consumers only purchase the cheapest
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drug and competitors sell at marginal production costs.
This chapter will start by discussing elements for developing countries that lead to
imperfect competition in a duopoly. The two aspects of distribution network width
and quality are motivated by papers from Chaudhuri, Goldberg, and Jia (2003),
Flynn, Hollis, and Palmedo (2009) as well as Bond and Saggi (2012), which are
introduced briefly. These characteristics gain a particular importance in light of
neglected diseases (NDs), which predominately affect the poor population. As a
next step the vertical and horizontal product differentiations are expressed formally,
but not solved explicitly. In order to parameterize the effect of ND characteristics on
consumer distribution, a simplified discrete model is introduced. This model covers
the same differentiation and is adequate for this purpose as discussed subsequently.
Most importantly the discrete duopoly model is not used to derive finding rather than
to illustrate the general findings with regard to remuneration as well as negotiations
in chapter 5. Finally, the remuneration for compulsory licensing is investigated and
put in relation to the results.
As a result of the imperfect competition induced by distribution network width
and quality, the generic competitor will not price at the marginal cost level. The
distribution of profit between innovator and licensee depends on the socioeconomic
prevalence of the respective disease and remuneration. The royalty rate by net sales
which is used as a remuneration increases the licensee’s price significantly by means of
a competition as well as costs amplified effect. This royalty impact on the price based
on costs as well as the result of imperfect competition are essential for understanding
the discrimination of least developed countries detailled in chapter 6.
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3.1. Drug Demand Characteristics in Light of
Neglected Diseases
In most developing countries drugs are payed out-of-the-pocket and thus the purchase
is considered by each consumer individually rather than by payers such as state or
private health insurances (Chaudhuri, Goldberg, and Jia (2003), p.1). Apart from
the price, other attributes play a role in this decision which lead to an imperfect
duopoly competition. They drive the player’s pricing decision when facing most
developing countries’ demand for drugs.
3.1.1. The Domestic Competitor’s Distribution Network
Advantage
Chaudhuri, Goldberg, and Jia (2003) shed light on the demand for drugs in devel-
oping countries by investigating the demand in India for fluoroquinolones, a sub-
segment of systemic antibacterials. Using a detailed product-level data set they
identify supply side parameters and expenditure elasticities by employing the so
called ”Almost Ideal Demand System” (Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)).1 Chaud-
huri, Goldberg, and Jia (2003) were able to allow for cross-molecule substitution by
1The ”Almost Ideal Demand System” was specified by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and is based
on a cost function that balances between bliss b(p) and mere subsistence a(p) with the utility
u  [0, 1]. The cost function takes the form ln c(u, p) = (1 − u) ln a(p) + u ln b(p). Using the
proposed functional forms ln a(p) = a0 +
∑
k ak ln pk +
1
2
∑
k
∑
j γ
∗
kj ln pk ln pj and ln b(p) =
ln a(p) + β0
∏
k p
βk
k leads to the general Almost Ideal Demand System cost function:
ln c(u, p) = a0 +
∑
k
ak ln pk +
1
2
∑
k
∑
j
γ∗kj ln pk ln pj + uβ0
∏
k
pβkk . (3.1)
The derivatives of the costs with respect to the price vector p are the quantities demanded, so
that the derivative of the logarithmized costs with respect to the logarithmized price gives the
budget shares wi of good i.
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grouping the products and using two levels of the demand system: While the higher
level allocates the expenditures between molecules, the lower level is designed to
estimate parameters within a fluoroquinolones molecule for different manufacturers.
While allowing for expenditure switches at the higher level of the system, Chaudhuri,
Goldberg, and Jia (2003) investigate the welfare losses in counterfeit scenarios with
the estimates in hand. By withdrawing one or more domestic competitors from the
system the compensation variation is applied as a measure for welfare losses.
Table 3.1.: Estimated cross-price elasticities by Chaudhuri, Goldberg, and Jia (2003) (ta-
ble 6a): While the diagonal values are (negative) own price elasticities, the
last column displays the elasticities of overall expenditure in the segment. The
remaining values are estimated cross-price elasticities, which are striking large
and positive between different domestic product groups.
A major finding is that domestic manufacturers face a relatively high rate of substi-
tution when competing with each other, compared to competing with a multinational
company. Table 3.1 shows these estimated cross price elasticities in the bottom right
quarter. Also, the welfare loss from withdrawing domestic manufacturers exceeds the
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loss induced by a price increase. The reason for their finding appears to be the wider
retail range of domestic manufacturers due to a more extensive network of pharma-
cies that stock their products. The ”domestic products are more readily available
to Indian consumers than products produced by foreign subsidiaries” as Chaudhuri,
Goldberg, and Jia (2003) (p. 4) explain. A multinational innovator usually does
not cover the entire country, especially not the rural areas. This is also plausible
considering that generic manufacturers typically offer a much larger portfolio than
innovators.
If a compulsory licensing is issued a multinational innovator will face competition
from a domestic generic distributer. Given the findings of Chaudhuri, Goldberg, and
Jia (2003) a geographic horizontal distinction between these competitors can not
be neglected when analyzing the impact of compulsory licensing (CL). This holds
especially since a government could enhance consumer welfare by licensing a domestic
generic competitor with a comprehensive distribution network.
3.1.2. The Innovator’s Quality Advantage
Quality concerns are not relevant for consumers in many developed nations, since
regulators and payers address this problem. In developing countries, however, out-of-
the pocket payment leads to a higher relevance of consumer preferences, weighting
quality and costs. A number of studies investigate the duopoly for a drug with
respect to the entry of generic competition due to patent expiry and emphasize
the importance of perceived quality differentiation (Regan (2007), Cabrales (2003)).
Not only can a quality difference be perceived by consumers, but might as well be
reasonable regarding the production of generics in developing countries. Thailand
and Brazil give striking examples of quality concerns after issuing CLs as described
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in section 2.2: While the licensed Brazil manufacturer FarManguinhos lagged the
technological knowledge to produce the drug for two years, the Thailand Government
Pharmaceutical Organization (GPO) is not able to deliver the desired quality to
date. For both countries Indian manufacturers supplied the drugs but even they
might face quality problems. For example, the European Medicines Agency has
recommended the recall of a generic clopidogrel from the Swiss manufacturer Acino
in 2010 produced in an Indian factory. This recommendation was motivated by a
failure of good manufacturing practice in an Indian plant (Hirschler (2010) - EU
plans recall of Indian-made generic Plavix ).
Such (perceived) quality differences can be projected to consumer preferences via
vertical differentiation. For example Bond and Saggi (2012) use a simple model of
vertical differentiation for compulsory licensing, arguing in a similar way. For Bond
and Saggi (2012) the duopoly resulting from CL is part of a game in which they in-
vestigate the behavior of a ”southern” government and a ”northern” innovator with
regard to CL. The employed model assumes a utility of U = ∆q − p per consumer,
whereas p denotes the product price and q is the products quality. The consumers
differ in their willingness to pay ∆ for quality and are uniformly distributed over
∆ ∈ [0, 1]. However, this assumption of uniform distributed consumers might not be
adequate as Flynn, Hollis, and Palmedo (2009) point out, especially when investigat-
ing CL in developing countries. Indeed, the following will show how consumer welfare
and company profits change dramatically and thus make a difference on decisions.
3.1.3. Income Inequality and Neglected Diseases
When drugs are payed out-of the pocket the most important restriction on consumer
preferences is the budget they can spend. Flynn, Hollis, and Palmedo (2009) elabo-
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rate this matter and argue that convexity of demand is induced by income inequality
in developing countries since patients in need of essential medicines are most likely
to spend whatever they have available. Convex demand implies that while the lower
income segment of the market is highly price elastic the other is not. Monopolists
are then tempted to serve only a smaller (high income) segment of the market, price
their drug high while maximizing profits, but causing a large deadweight loss on the
consumer side. Clearly, for essential medicines deadweight losses describe no other
but the denial of access to essential treatment. Flynn, Hollis, and Palmedo (2009)
bring this forward to justify compulsory licensing in developing countries generally.
Figure 3.1.: South Africa Distribution of Income from Flynn, Hollis, and Palmedo (2009),
figure 3. The graph shows the distribution of average per capita income for
population deciles in South Africa in 2000.
The authors substantiate the argument by means of income distribution in developing
countries, as an example in figure 3.1 for South Africa. By assuming that the ability
to pay is proportional to income and uniform incidence across income levels Flynn,
Hollis, and Palmedo (2009) derive the demand in figure 3.2. This demand curve
is highly convex and emphasizes that companies will exclude a large low income
segment while pricing hight. Figure 3.3 shows the respective revenue gained by
a monopolist when pricing according to the demand function per quantity. The
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Figure 3.2.: Exemplary South Africa demand curve from Flynn, Hollis, and Palmedo
(2009), figure 4.1. The Figure gives the estimated demand assuming that the
ability to pay is proportional (5%) to the income in figure 3.1 and incidence
equal across income levels.
Figure 3.3.: Exemplary South Africa sales
revenue from Flynn, Hollis, and Palmedo
(2009), figure 4.2. It shows companies rev-
enue while satisfying the price conditions
required to sell the respective quantities.
Figure 3.4.: Exemplary Norway sales rev-
enue from Flynn, Hollis, and Palmedo
(2009), figure 5.2. Similar to figure 3.3.
optimal monopolistic price would only serve the first income decile. The importance
of income becomes evident when comparing this with Norway, derived in the same
way and shown in figure 3.4.
The assumption of uniform incidence across income levels serves the purpose of
demonstrating the income distribution effect on monopolistic pricing behavior. How-
ever, it is not adequate when it comes to compulsory licensing for neglected diseases
(ND) predominantly affecting the poor population in developing countries.
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3.2. Asymmetric Duopoly Model
The following will explain an idealized two dimensional demand model which ac-
counts for the two factors of vertical and horizontal differentiation discussed above.
While this model is not used going forward, a more practical model of asymmetric
demand is introduced which permits to actuate ND characteristics. This model is
used to illustrate other findings with regard to remuneration or negotiations
3.2.0.1. Two Dimensional Demand
The upcoming utilizes a generalization of Hotelling’s location model with 2 charac-
teristics, which are quality and location as argued above (Hotelling (1929)).2 Only
price competition is relevant here because characteristics are assumed to be already
formed. All parameters concerning this model are tagged with a tilde (as in x˜) to
avoid confusion with other models.
The innovator (IV ) and generic competitor (GC) compete in the characteristics of
location and quality which are described by the vector ı˜ = {ı˜Q, ı˜L ∈ [0, 1]} for a
company ı˜, that is ı˜v = {ı˜vQ, ı˜vL ∈ [0, 1]} and g˜c = {g˜cQ, g˜cL ∈ [0, 1]}. Each
consumer type c˜ is characterized in the same area by c˜ = {c˜Q, c˜L ∈ [0, 1]} and they
are distributed by f˜{c˜Q, c˜L} over the respective area C˜ = [0, 1]2.
An important effect of compulsory licensing is the improved access to drugs, which
2Apart from Hotelling (1929), two frequently cited works in this are are Caplin and Nalebuff
(1991) and Irmen and Thisse (1996). Whereas Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) provide a prove on
the existence of a price equilibrium, Irmen and Thisse (1996) employ a sequential game in which
firms first form the characteristics and then compete in prices to reveal that in their setting min-
imum differentiation occurs in all but one characteristic. Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) approach
is more general and they show that for n characteristics and i products and given linearity of
consumers preferences in characteristics as well as a ρ-concave consumer’s distribution across
these characteristics, a price equilibrium exists. Additionally, for i=2 this equilibrium is unique.
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can be captured by incorporating a budget restriction. Let c˜I be the income of a
respective consumer with c˜I ∈ [0, 1]. c˜I ican be assumed to be linked to c˜Q directly,
in particular c˜I = c˜Q. In developing countries consumers can not lend money for
medications easily so that the budget restriction c˜I = c˜Q > p must hold for any price
p˜ of the drug that is purchased.
The utilities of a consumer purchasing the medication from IV or GC are given by
U˜IV (c˜) = S˜ + ı˜vQ · c˜Q + ı˜vl · c˜l + c˜Y − p˜IV and
U˜GC(c˜) = S˜ + g˜cQ · c˜Q + ı˜vl · c˜l + c˜Y − p˜GC .
The constant S˜ denotes the gross consumer surplus of using any of the two drugs and
equals across all consumer types. Quality characteristics are preset and maximum as
well as minimum (perceived) quality is represented by the two competitors so that
ı˜vQ = 1 and g˜cQ = 0. GC is assumed to have a very broad distribution network
available and consumers in rural area can access the drug optimally compared to IV
so that ı˜vl = 0 and g˜cl = 1. Consumers located in the rural area value a distribution
network most and are characterized by c˜l = 1.
A consumer will decide to use GC’s drug, if U˜GC(C˜) ≥ U˜IV (C˜) and thus the con-
sumer’s indifference curve is defined by U˜GC(C˜) = U˜IV (C˜). The indifferent consumer
satisfies
U˜IV (c) = U˜GC(c)
S˜ + ı˜vQ · c˜Q + ı˜vL · c˜L + c˜Y − p˜IV = S˜ + g˜cQ · c˜Q + ı˜vL · c˜L + c˜Y − p˜GC
S˜ + 1 · c˜Q + 0 · c˜L + c˜Q − p˜IV = S˜ + 0 · c˜Q + 1 · c˜L + c˜Q − p˜GC
c˜Q − p˜IV = c˜L − p˜GC
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and a consumer prefers IV ’s product for c˜Q ≥ p˜IV +c˜L−p˜GC . If additionally c˜Q ≥ p˜IV
the consumer can afford it and accordingly the demand is given by
D˜IV =
∫∫
C˜IV
f˜(c˜Q, c˜L)dc˜Qdc˜L and
D˜GC =
∫∫
C˜GC
f˜(c˜Q, c˜L)dc˜Qdc˜L,
whereas
C˜IV = {c˜Q, c˜L ∈ [0, 1]2 | c˜Q ≥ p˜IV and c˜Q ≥ p˜IV + c˜L − p˜GC}
C˜GC = {c˜Q, c˜L ∈ [0, 1]2 | c˜Q ≥ p˜GC and c˜Q < p˜IV + c˜L − p˜GC}.
This duopoly model gives the vertical and horizontal differentiation in a continu-
ous way. However, the budget restrictions do not satisfy the condition of linear
consumer’s preferences which are sufficient for a price equilibrium as depicted by
Caplin and Nalebuff (1991). A price equilibrium is numerically computable over the
relevant area, but not practically with a parameter α measuring neglected disease
(ND) characteristics in the consumer’s demand. This parameter α would control the
non-uniform consumer distribution by allocating more consumers with strong budget
restrictions in the rural area for NDs.
Yet, it is important to compare the impact of CL on a drug designed to treat ND to a
CL on medications for global diseases. For NDs, per definition the patients are more
likely to be located in rural areas than in developed cities and ND affect predomi-
nantly the poor. This will effect both, vertical as well as horizontal differentiation,
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by means of budget and location changes in the consumer distribution. In order to
understand the impact of CL induced competition for ND the following will derive
a simpler model which additionally fits the reality better, as will be described in the
next chapter 5.
3.2.0.2. Discrete Asymmetric Duopoly Model
In order to address the above effects a plausible approach is to utilize a non-continuous
consumer distribution and to consider two distinct consumer types Θˆ. All parameters
concerning the discrete asymmetric duopoly model are tagged with a hat (as in xˆ)
to avoid confusion with other models. An innovator (IV ) which sells a medication in
developing countries might exclude a portion αˆ of patients from treatment, depend-
ing on the drug price as well as the distribution network. Generally, for NDs more
patients (αˆ) would be affected by these attributes than for global diseases as section
3.1.3 describes. For simplicity, both attributes are factored into the same parameter,
assuming that poverty comes along with rural settlement or vice versa. These αˆ
consumers Θˆ, which are not reached by IV in a monopoly situation, are for notation
and simplicity reasons described as located in the rural area (RˆA). Accordingly, they
are of the type ΘˆRˆA contrary to consumers in the city Θˆ ˆCTY .
While per definition IV does not have access to the αˆ patients of type ΘˆRˆA, or vice
versa, a domestic generic competitor GC could sell the drug to these consumers.
This is assumed to hold absolutely for matters of distribution network by means of
Chaudhuri, Goldberg, and Jia (2003), while consumer’s budget distribution as well
as GCs price determine access in terms of budget. The revenue of GC in rural areas
ΠˆRˆAGC(αˆ, pˆGC) is given by Dˆ
RˆA
GC(pˆGC)pˆGC , with the demand Dˆ
RˆA
GC(pˆGC) decreasing in
pˆGC .
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Both firms IV and GC have access to the consumers of type Θˆ ˆCTY , who choose
between the two drugs IV and GC that compete in a setting of vertical differentiation
without budget constraints. Θˆ ˆCTY can afford any drug and chooses between the two
products in consideration of price and quality.
Let the distribution of consumers Θˆ ˆCTY be uniform and normalized to
1∫
0
fˆ(cˆQ)dcˆQ =
1. The consumer’s preferences are linearly determined by the valuation of quality
cˆQ ∈ [0, 1], the utility Sˆ of consuming any drug and the prices pˆIV and pˆGC . The
drugs IV and GC are differentiated via the qualities ıˆvQ = 1 and gˆcQ = 0 so that
the preferences for each drug are give by
Uˆ IVcˆ (pˆIV , pˆGC , cˆQ) = Sˆ + cˆQ · ıˆvQ − pˆIV
= Sˆ + cˆQ − pˆIV and
UˆGCcˆ (pˆIV , pˆGC , cˆQ) = Sˆ + cˆQ · gˆcQ − pˆGC
= Sˆ − pˆGC .
A consumer with cˆQ = pˆIV − pˆGC thus is indifferent between consuming IV or GC.
Accordingly,
Dˆ
ˆCTY
GC (pˆIV , pˆGC) =
pˆIV −pˆGC∫
0
fˆ(cˆQ)dcˆQ
⇔ Dˆ ˆCTYGC (pˆIV , pˆGC) = pˆIV − pˆGC (3.2)
and
Dˆ
ˆCTY
IV (pˆIV , pˆGC) =
1∫
pˆIV −pˆGC
fˆ(cˆQ)dcˆQ
⇔ Dˆ ˆCTYIV (pˆIV , pˆGC) = 1 + pˆGC − pˆIV (3.3)
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= 1− Dˆ ˆCTYGC (pˆIV , pˆGC)
give the demand for both products in the city.
While the total profit for GC depends on Dˆ
ˆCTY
GC as well as Dˆ
RˆA
GC , the innovator IV
only sells Dˆ
ˆCTY
IV in the city. Ignoring, for now, any remunerations payed from GC to
IV the profits are given by
ΠˆGC = (1− αˆ)pˆGCDˆ ˆCTYGC + αˆpˆGCDˆRˆAGC and (3.4)
ΠˆIV = (1− αˆ)pˆIV Dˆ ˆCTYIV . (3.5)
The parameter αˆ ∈ [0, 1] controls the ND characteristics in the consumer’s demand.
For example, while a drug targeting diabetes type 2 (αˆ = 0) might face full competi-
tion, a medication treating dengue fever (αˆ = 1) will predominantly affect the poor
in rural areas.
The optimal price pˆ∗IV is determined by optimizing 3.4 with the demand in 3.3.
Without specifying the demand in rural areas DˆRˆAGC , this leads to
max
pˆIV
ΠˆIV = (1− αˆ)(1 + pˆGC − pˆIV )pˆIV ) (3.6)
⇒ 0 = (1− αˆ)(1 + pˆGC − 2pˆ∗IV ) (3.7)
⇒ pˆ∗IV (pˆGC) =
1 + pˆGC
2
(3.8)
as a reaction to pˆGC with
∂2ΠˆIV
∂pˆ2IV
= 2αˆ− 2 ≤ 0 since αˆ ≤ 1.
The implications of vertical and horizontal differentiation in this setup on IV ’s profits
are demonstrated in picture 3.5. It gives the profit of IV for a given price pˆGC
with the optimal reaction pˆIV by IV in the absence of any remuneration. While
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a Bertrand price competition would result in zero profits, the quality advantage
of IV accounts for a positive profit of IV even though competition occurs. For
sole quality competition the optimal equilibrium price of GC would be pˆGC =
1
3
and the red line in picture 3.5 indicates the resulting profits of IV for a given αˆ
with pˆ∗IV =
1+pˆGC
2
= 2
3
. However, plain vertical differentiation such as employed
by Bond and Saggi (2012) is not sufficient in a CL scenario when considering NDs.
For diseases predominately affecting the poor, quality becomes less important while
consumer budgets and distribution give domestic generic manufacturer an advantage.
Figure 3.5.: The Innovator’s profit in dependence of price pˆGC and neglected disease
characteristics α, while ignoring any remuneration. The red line indicates
the profit in case of pure vertical differentiation (pˆGC =
1
3).
With regard to the optimization ratio of GC it would be problematic to assume any
demand function for the rural area. In fact, considering pˆGC as a given parameter
is sufficient for the results since it is subject to negotiations rather than demand as
chapter 5 will clarify.
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3.3. Remuneration and Compulsory Licensing
Rarely discussed in economic literature related to compulsory licensing are the terms
of remuneration, which a potential patentee is obligated to pay the innovator. Struc-
ture and height of this transfer are not settled by the WTO TRIPS agreement, but
chosen by the respective government. In practice a small royalty per sales applies
and table 3.2 gives the actual compulsory licenses chronologically based on table 2.1.
It includes information on the involved parties as well as the respective royalty rates.
For Zimbabwe, Egypt and Ghana the royalty rates are not available.
Table 3.2.: Compulsory licenses and remunerations. Sources, definitions on acronyms for
companies and other details are provided in appendix A.1.
It is striking that all remunerations are royalties, rather than a lump sum. Further,
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all but one country applied a royalty based on the net sale of GC. Only Ecuador
used the so called ”Tiered Royalty Method” (TRM) which is based on prices in the
developed world rather than the net sales. This approach is detailed further below.
Most significantly, the royalty rates are quite low, ranging between 0.5% and 6%
with Mozambique beeing the only exception.
3.3.1. General Royalty Effects on the Licensee’s Price
Economic considerations on the remuneration are set out by Tirole (2006): Propor-
tional royalties based on the sales, and thus acting as a tax, would better ”reflect
the size of the market for a particular pharmaceutical (for example, how widespread
the disease is in the country)” (Tirole (2006), p. 315). On the contrary, a single
payment could better differentiate between low income and middle income coun-
tries. The WHO recommends a tiered royalty method suggested by Love (2005),
which is based on the patented drug price in high income countries rather than the
generic drug price in the considered developing country (Love (2005) pp. 7). The
recommendation fixes the royalty at 4% but is adjused by the relative income per
capita. This tired royalty method was applied by Ecuador compulsory licensing for
ritonavir, which is depicted in section 2.2. Both, Tirole (2006) and Love (2005) ac-
knowledged that a royalty by sales increases the price of the respective generic drug
and accordingly reduces access in the absence of any covering health insurance.
Generally, the profit of GC when paying a royalty based on net sales is given by
ΠGC = DGC(pGC , pIV )((1− r)pGC − vc) (3.9)
with variable costs vc and royalty r per sales. If the second order conditions are
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satisfied, the optimal price for GC is given by
p∗GC =
DGC(pGC , pIV )
−∂DGC(pGC ,pIV )
∂pGC
+
vc
1− r , or
⇔ p∗GC =
DGC(pGC , pIV )
−∂DGC(pGC ,pIV )
∂pGC
+ vc+ vc
r
1− r . (3.10)
The direct royalty effect vc r
1−r on the optimal price p
∗
GC depends on the production
costs vc. This costs amplified royalty effect is in line with Tirole (2006), who states
that a royalty ”would not affect the final price much, especially for those medicines
with low production costs”. However, competition further amplifies the royalty effect
on p∗GC , since the optimal price of IV changes in r as well. Intuitively, with the
introduction of a royalty by sales IV has an interest in GC’s demand. The profit of
IV with royalty is given by
ΠIV = DIV (pIV , pGC)(pIV − vc) + rpGCDGC(pGC , pIV ), (3.11)
assuming that IV and GC face equivalent production costs vc per unit. If the second
order conditions are satisfied, the optimal price for IV is
p∗IV =
DIV (pIV , pGC)
−∂DIV (pIV ,pGC)
∂pIV
+ vc+ r · pGC ∂DGC(pGC , pIV )
∂pIV
. (3.12)
The difference to an optimal price for IV in the absence of royalty payments lies in r ·
pGC
∂DGC(pGC ,pIV )
∂pIV
, which is positive for r > 0 under the assumption of ∂DGC(pGC ,pIV )
∂pIV
≥
0. The effect of pIV on DGC(pGC , pIV ) depends on the intensity of competition but it
is intuitive to assume this effect to be non-negative, so that ∂DGC(pGC ,pIV )
∂pIV
> 0 holds.
The next question is how GC reacts to this increased price. The derivative of 3.10
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with regard to pIV leads to
∂p∗GC
∂pIC
=
∂DGC(pGC ,pIV )
∂pIV
· (−∂DGC(pGC ,pIV )
∂pGC
)−DGC(pGC , pIV ) · (−∂2DGC(pGC ,pIV )∂pGC∂pIV )
(−∂DGC(pGC ,pIV )
∂pGC
)2
.
This expression is positive for:
∂DGC(pGC , pIV )
∂pIV
≥ 0, (3.13)
∂DGC(pGC , pIV )
∂pGC
≤ 0 and (3.14)
−∂
2DGC(pGC , pIV )
∂pGC∂pIV
≤ 0. (3.15)
While the assumption 3.13 is reasonable and already used for 3.12, assumption 3.14
is straight forward as well. Assumption 3.15 might not be clear at first sight but
matches intuition when phrasing it. It demands that the ”negative effect of increasing
pGC on GC’s demand decreases in the innovator’s price pIV ”. This is not necessary
but simplifies the interpretation: For higher pIV , the consumers are less price sensitive
with regard to pGC . In fact, it would be necessary that an actual positive effect of
increasing pIV on
∂DGC(pGC ,pIV )
∂pGC
is not too high.
The argumentation here follows intuition: With the introduction of a royalty, IV is
interested in GC’s profit and a higher price pIV now additionally increases the royalty
profit apart from the income per unit. This consideration increases the optimal price
and the desired effect occurs: GC’s demand increases and GC in turn adjusts by
increasing the price pGC . Summarizing, a royalty by sales does increase the price
of the generic drug to a greater extend than anticipated. Any competition, which
innovator and generic manufacturer certainly engage in, increase the royalty’s effect
on the price additionally to the cost amplified royalty effect. This only holds for
royalties based on net sales and not for the tiered royalty method.
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In order to demonstrate the impact of a royalty on price and access the following
will apply this general concept to the discrete asymmetric duopoly model.
3.3.2. Exemplary Demonstration of Royalty Effects
Introducing a net sales based royalty and variable costs in the discrete asymmetric
demand model changes the profit functions of GC (3.4) and IV (3.5) to
Π¯IV = (1− α¯)D¯ ¯CTYIV (p¯IV − vc) + (1− α¯)rp¯GCD¯ ¯CTYGC + α¯rp¯GCD¯R¯AGC and (3.16)
Π¯GC = (1− α¯)D¯ ¯CTYGC ((1− r)p¯GC − vc) + α¯D¯R¯AGC((1− r)p¯GC − vc). (3.17)
Assuming full competition with α¯ = 0 enables us to investigate the above depicted
effects. Then, α¯D¯R¯AGC = 0 and thus IV and GC engaging in plain vertical differenti-
ation with a royalty r, so that
Π¯α¯=1IV = D¯
¯CTY
IV (p¯IV − vc) + rp¯GCD¯ ¯CTYGC and
Π¯α¯=1GC = D¯
¯CTY
GC ((1− r)p¯GC − vc).
The demand functions D¯
¯CTY
IV and D¯
¯CTY
GC stay untouched and from the demand func-
tions 3.2 and 3.3 we get the objective profit functions
max
p¯IV
Π¯α¯=1IV = (p¯IV − vc)(1 + p¯GC − p¯IV ) + rp¯GC(p¯IV − p¯GC)
⇒ 0 = (1 + p¯GC − p¯IV )− (p¯IV − vc) + rp¯GC
⇒ p¯∗α¯=1IV (p¯GC) =
1 + vc+ (1 + r)p¯GC
2
(3.18)
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and
max
p¯GC
Π¯α¯=1GC = (p¯GC − rp¯GC − vc)(p¯IV − p¯GC)
⇒ 0 = (1− r)(p¯IV − p¯GC)− ((1− r)p¯GC − vc)
⇒ p¯∗α¯=1GC (p¯IV ) =
(1− r)p¯IV + vc
2− 2r .
These prices maximize the respective profits since
∂2Π¯α¯=1IV
∂p¯2IV
= −2 < 0 and ∂2Π¯α¯=1GC
∂p¯2GC
=
−2 + 2r < 0 for r < 1. The mutual optimal prices are
p¯∗α¯=1IV (r, vc) =
2 + 2vc− 2r − vc · r
3− 4r + r2
p¯∗α¯=1GC (r, vc) =
1 + vc(3− r)− r
3− 4r + r2 ,
and for r = 0 they become 2
3
+ vc or 1
3
+ vc for IV and GC, respectively. The total
royalty effect on the optimal price for GC thus is p∗α¯=1GC (r, vc) − 13 + vc. The cost
amplified royalty effect (REvc) and the competition amplified royalty effect (REcomp)
can be separated as follows
REcomp = p
∗α¯=1
GC (r, 0)− p∗α¯=1GC (0, 0)
REvc = p
∗α¯=1
GC (r, vc)−REvc − p∗α¯=1GC (0, vc),
which are visualized in figure 3.6. Note that the competition amplified royalty effect
REcomp in % only changes in vc since the ratio is based on p
∗α¯=1
GC (r = 0, vc), while
absolutly it is independent of vc. The Figure 3.6 demonstrates that REcomp can be
of some significance compared to REvc for lower vc.
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Figure 3.6.: Separated effects of royalty on generic price REcomp and REcomp +REvc in
% of p∗α¯=1GC (r = 0, vc) for r ∈ [0, 0.5] and vc ∈ [0, 0.5].
hold.
3.4. Conclusion
The foregoing chapter detailed the framework of global Intellectual property rights
and introduced the compulsory licensing (CL). While being obliged to grand patent
protection for new medicines a government can introduce a competitor by utilizing
CL. This measure is supposed to drive down prices and thus increase access. Be-
fore exploring the impact on incentives for research and development (R&D) in an
international environment this chapter focuses on the static impact in a closed econ-
omy without dynamics. We explore the question on how the duopoly will unfold if
compulsory licensing is issued. For this purpose we highlight the characteristics of
drug demand in developing countries, depict a model which is later used to illustrate
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findings and analyze the effects of remuneration on generic pricing.
Since drug payments are mostly out of the pocket, quality and price play an impor-
tant role in the consumer’s decision about purchasing drugs in developing countries.
Further, multinational innovators might have a disadvantage on distribution net-
works, especially when it comes to neglected diseases (ND). To capture these effects
a discrete asymmetric duopoly model is introduced which demonstrates that the
innovator (IV) will be able to keep some profits in case of compulsory licensing,
contrary to a Bertrand duopoly scenario. Additionally, the generic competitor (GC)
will most likely be able to cut a share of profits due to the vast distribution network.
How the duopoly manifests strongly depends on the type of disease and it’s socioe-
conomic prevalence. Further, the optimal price of the generic competitor is likely to
be determined by factors outside of this duopoly situation such as negotiations and
government control.
When turning to the remuneration we find that almost all countries applied a small
royalty by net sales when issuing compulsory licensing. Such net sales based royalties
unfortunately have the side effect of increasing the licensee’s price, amplified by the
costs. While this single effect might be negligible, competition further amplifies the
royalty effect on the licensee’s generic price, which is not accounted for in economic
literature.
While these effects are demonstrated in the discrete asymmetric duopoly model the
deployed assumption on demand is exemplary only. The developed discrete asym-
metric model demonstrates the specific drivers of demand in developing countries
plainly. Yet, it is a theoretical construct that requires further refinement and test-
ing. In this model IV does not have the option to increase its market by cutting price
and extending the distribution network. Further research could bring more clarity
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to the CL duopoly by refining and testing this model. For the purpose of applying
data, estimating parameters and testing the basic conjunction the 2-dimensional ap-
proach depicted beginning of section 2.2 is favorable over the discrete model because
it imposes less restrictions to the structure of demand.
As an outlook, GC will set the price pGC based on circumstances outside of this
system. To begin with, CL is usually flanked with government subsidies for GC
and other measures to increase access to the specific treatment. For example the
much praised ”Brazil model” for AIDS treatment consist of the goal to provide free
universal access to treatment paired with heavy utilization of CL, either by issuing or
using CL as a threat in price negotiations (Nunn et al. (2007) p. 1805). A comparable
effect on domestic generic manufacturers’ demand and pricing decisions will have
the 2012 so called ”$5.4 billion policy” of India. Patients will get free access to any
generic drug in major city hospitals as well as the smallest rural clinic. This policy
was enacted in July 2012 and is expected to unfold within 5 years (Reuters (2012c)).
Further, if not government owned, GC has to apply for compulsory licensing and
propose a price pAGC to the government, which will remain fixed. Accordingly, pGC
is not determined via demand, but by GC’s effort to convince the government of
compulsory licensing and undercut potential competitors.
The implications of these mechanisms are left unsolved in this chapter and GC’s
price is assumed to be given externally. However, the results will serve as a base for
the discussion of the bargaining that takes place between innovator, generic com-
petitor and government. These negotiations about price, royalty and the utilization
of compulsory licensing depend on the outcome of such duopoly as the next chapter
will demonstrate.
The results on royalty are general and represent a disadvantage of the compulsory
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licensing instrument as used today. Chapter 6 will address the royalties again and
investigate the effects in an international environment with cross border compulsory
licenses. It will become apparent that least developed countries dependent on drug
imports face a disadvantage compared to middle income countries.
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4. Dynamic Aspects: Incentives
In the preceding chapters we briefly described the context of global patent protection
and introduced the concept of compulsory licensing (CL) which each member of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) is allowed to make use of. It permits a country to
allow a generic manufacturer the production and marketing of a patented drug and
effectively transform a patent monopoly into a duopoly. This duopoly is not perfect
and the resulting prices are most likely not at marginal cost level. The innovator
enjoys a perceived quality advantage while the domestic licensee can deploy a wide
distribution network and reach rural areas the innovator cannot. While these results
are based on static duopoly analysis we now turn to the dynamic aspects in a closed
economy before dismissing this last restriction in chapter 6.
The word dynamic derives from the Greek δυναµις (dynamis) and means power, yet
today is often used to express change. Accordingly, a dynamic system refers to a
system in which parameters change over time. Similarly, dynamics in the economic
context aim to capture the influence of time in a model. There are two main dynamic
elements of compulsory licensing. It constitutes an interference with the patent
system and the question arises if it has an effect on incentives. This aspect of
dynamics is discussed in this chapter. Further, all compulsory licensing episodes
identified in chapter 2 are preceded by negotiations. We address the question which
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effect these negotiations have on the usage of compulsory licensing and its outcome
in the next chapter 5.
At first we focus on the incentives induced by a patent system and elaborate the
concept as analyzed by Arrow (1962). Thereupon we look at the weaknesses of
patent systems in particular related to research for medications. The second part of
the chapter briefly discusses mechanisms proposed in the economic literature that aim
to foster private research and development (R&D) activity for neglected diseases. In
this context we discuss Patent Buyouts (Kremer (1998)), Health Impact Fund (Hollis
and Pogge (2008)) and last but not least Advanced Market Commitments (Kremer
(2001)).
4.1. Incentives for Pharmaceutical Research
Generally, there are two monetary ways to leverage and incentivize innovation from
a governments perspective. While one way is to fund research projects or reduce its
costs directly (”push”), an indirect way is to create prizes for successful innovations
(”pull”). While a pull incentive includes concrete prizes for inventions it also en-
velopes the expectation of future sales in wealthy markets, in particular by means
of patents. Grace and Kyle (2009) explain that push and pull mechanisms are usu-
ally implemented together in many sectors, especially with regard to pharmaceutical
research. While there are many directly funded institutions, pharmaceutical compa-
nies invest in research and are driven by expectations on exclusivity. Pull incentives
deflect the risks of research failure to the private sector, because they reward results
only. The other side of the coin is a possible wasteful duplication of research effort.
The following will briefly outline the economic theory around patent protection and
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point out a number of general problems coming along with this system.
4.1.1. Economics of Patents
Arrow (1962) formalized a system which models the incentive to innovate in a ground-
breaking essay. He drew a comparison between monopolistic and competitive mar-
kets for process innovation. An important finding is that the incentive exceeds for a
competitive market structure, irrespective the production cost advantage gained by
the innovation.
In Arrow’s model a process innovation per definition reduces the constant cost per
unit from c to c < c.1. This approach can also be interpreted as product innovation,
which is described later.
In a monopolistic market the innovator is defined to gain the profit P (c) before and
P (c) after the innovation. This corresponds to the optimal monopolistic prices pm(c)
and pm(c) as well as the resulting output xm(c) and xm(c), respectively. On the one
hand the incentive to innovate in a monopolistic situation is P (c) − P (c). On the
other hand this equals the change in marginal revenue R(x) adjusted by the change
in production costs:
P (c)− P (c) =
∫ xm(c)
xm(c)
R(x)dx− (cxm(c)− cxm(c)). (4.1)
A competitive framework is defined by zero profits with pricing at marginal costs
prior to the innovation. Arrow distinguishes two situations: In case of pm(c) <
c (drastic innovation) the innovator would demand a royalty r = pm(c) − c from
1Arrow (1962)’s notation of costs aligned with Tirole (1988) to simplify matters when it comes to
the welfare analysis (Tirole (1988) p. 391)
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competitors to use the innovation and the incentive to innovate is P (c). In the case
of pm(c) > c (non-drastic innovation) the optimal royalty for the innovator would
be r = c − c so that the price remains at c and thus the innovator’s revenue equals
xm(c)(c− c).
Clearly, the incentive to innovate from a monopolists point of view (P (c)− P (c)) is
less than in a competitive framework (P (c)) for drastic innovations (pm(c) < c). For
a non-drastic innovation (pm(c) > c) consider equation 4.1 with R(x) decreasing in
x. The monopoly output before invention R(xm(c)) is defined by the optimal choice
R(xm(c)) = c. Accordingly,
∫ xm(c)
xm(c)
R(x)dx < c(xm(c)− xm(c))
⇔
∫ xm(c
xm(c)
R(x)dx− ((c)xm(c)− cxm(c)) < c(xm(c)− xm(c))− (cxm(c)− cxm(c))
⇔ P (c)− P (c) < (c− c)xm(c) < (c− c)xc(c),
for a declining demand curve and thus xm(c) < xc(c) since pm(c) > c.
Hence, the incentive to innovate in a perfect competitive scenario exceeds the in-
centive for a monopolist (Vm < Vc). The previous monopolist’s revenue acts as an
inhibitor for research for both, drastic and non-drastic innovations.
The above formalized incentives to innovate can be interpreted as a product inno-
vation for c = ∞ with P (c) = 0 and x(c) = 0. Accordingly, a distinction between
monopoly and competition situation is not required and a product innovation is al-
ways drastic (pm(c) < c). However, a product innovation in a field might replace
the companies prior profits with an inferior product. Accordingly, the differentia-
tion between competition and monopoly before the innovation is of relevance. The
incentive to innovate thus equals P (c) = 0 and is grater than or equals the incentive
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of process innovation.
Arrow (1962) additionally compares the desirable social benefit to the incentive for
an innovator and argues that it always exceeds. The approach is to compare above
described incentives with the consumer’s welfare gains a social planer would achieve
when pricing at production costs after innovation.
With regards to a process innovation, the analysis is separated by monopolistic
and competitive situation as well as drastic (pm(c) < c) and non-drastic innovation
(pm(c) > c).
2
In case of drastic innovation in the competitive scenario the consumer’s benefit in-
creases, whereas for non-drastic innovations the price remains fixed at c and only the
innovator benefits. Taking into account that the incentive to innovate in a compet-
itive situation is always higher than a monopolist’s incentive (Vm < Vc) indicates a
major invention not being profit maximizing while socially desirable.
Formally consider the monopolist’s additional revenue due to the invention as
Vm =
∫ c
c
D(pm(c))dc.
A social planner would set the price after the invention to c. Hence the additional
social surplus equals
Vs =
∫ c
c
D(c)dc,
and since pm(c) > c it follows that Vm < Vs due to the underproduction of the
monopolist.
2For this and the following see Tirole (1988) p. 391 et seqq., with the interest rate being suppressed
(r = 1).
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In a competitive scenario for a non-drastic innovation the price would remain fixed
at c and the incentive is
V NDc = (c− c)D(c) =
∫ c
c
D(c)dc,
whilst for a drastic innovation
V Dc = (pm(c)− c)D(pm(c)) =
∫ pm(c)
c
D(pm(c))dc.
From the consumer’s demand D(c) < D(c) we get V NDc < Vs and pmc < c (drastic in-
novation) yields V Dc < V
D
s .
3 Summarizing, the socially desirable incentive is neither
attained by a monopoly nor by a competitive patent situation and the competitive
incentive always exceeds the monopolist’s, so that Vm < Vc < Vs.
The incentive induced by product innovation does also not match the socially de-
sirable. A product innovation is always drastic, but further assume that the inno-
vator does not replace a profit generating prior product. The incentive then equals
V Dc = (pm(c) − c)D(pm(c)) and as such lacks the consumer’s benefit. Addition-
ally, the incentive induced by product innovation is inferior due to the problem of
monopolistic underproduction.
An analysis of patent systems is very complex and in particular the incentives for
R&D are subject to a plurality of mechanics and effects. Tirole (1988) emphasizes
that a judgment on the welfare effects of patent systems cannot be finalized as
important aspects are yet to be explored.
3One can also see here as shown above: Given that D(c) > D(pm(c)) for all c ≥ c in a non-
drastic situation (c < pm(c) ≤ pm(c)), clearly V NDm < V NDc . Additionally considering V Dm =
(pm(c) − c)D(pm(c)) − (pm(c) − c)D(pm(c)) gives the same argumentation as above (V Dc =
P (c) > V Dm = P (c)− P (c)) and Vm < Vc always.
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Comparing the incentive induced by a patent system with the socially desirable
incentive shows, that it is subject to a variety of distorting effects. The analysis above
explains why the incentive generated by a patent system is generally inferior to the
welfare effect a social planner could achieve. On the contrary, this incentive might
excess, as the innovator does not internalize the competitor’s profit losses suffered
from the innovation (Scherer (2007) pp. 41-43). Non generic ”me-too” drugs do not
provide any significant treatment advantage but bypass the patent. Such products as
well as patent races might lead to a cumulated over-investment into research, as well.
Tirole (1988) names these the appropriability effect (inhibiting effect on incentive)
and the business stealing effects (excess effects on incentive).
4.1.2. Patent Critique & Industrial Drug Development
With particular regard to drugs, another group of incentive deforming effects unveils
of which some entail additional negative properties. If patent enforcement leaks, an-
ticipated counterfeits would reduce the incentive to innovate. In the worst case such
counterfeits could also be dangerous for consumers: A ”random mixtures of harmful
toxic substances” or ”inactive, ineffective preparations” could ”result in treatment
failure or even death” (World Health Organization (2010a)). This predominantly
affects developing countries as patent enforcement is particularly weak (Hollis and
Pogge (2008), p. 85).
An aspect introduced as the ”Tragedy of the Anticommons” by Heller and Eisenberg
(1998) indicates deficient incentives, but moreover complicates the administration of
medications. Initially, Heller and Eisenberg (1998) argued against the privatization
of bio-medical research during the 1980s and provided a refutation to the ”Tragedy
of the Commons”, Hardin (1968). The innovation inhibiting effect arises form the
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anticipated high costs of getting ”access to multiple patented inputs to create a
single useful product” (Heller and Eisenberg (1998), p. 699), which are boosted by
strategic behavior as well as transaction costs. Multiple administrations of diverse
substances, patented by different innovators, can prove cumbersome and costly for
patients in developing countries with an inadequate health care distribution grid. In
fact, this effect of patent protection could be an additional reason for compulsory
licensing and alternative mechanisms for developing countries.
The incentive for R&D with regard to communicable diseases lacks another impor-
tant component, since the treatment of such diseases does not only help the infected
patients. It has a positive effect on not yet infected patients and supports the con-
tainment of the disease. These externalities are not included in the private valuation
of a consumer and not monetarily rewarded to the innovator.
In the absence of any obligatory state health insurance, for example in developing
countries, two critical and serious problems arise. Firstly, it is not possible to per-
fectly price discriminate and a uniform price will hinder access for the poor popula-
tion. Furthermore diseases that affect predominantly the poor will not be sufficiently
reflected by the incentives induced by patents. Both these problems require a closer
look and are further discussed below.
Intellectual property rights are at the times a driving factor in many industries and
range from copyrights over trademarks to patents and more. Patents are mainly
filed in computer technologies, electrical machinery and pharmaceuticals as well as
medical technology today (World Intellectual Property Organization (2011), p. 76
and Table A.7.1.1). Scherer (2007) demonstrates the density of research and de-
velopment (R&D) in pharmaceuticals by considering the R&D/sales ratio, which is
extraordinary high. He identifies several reasons why a reliable patent protection
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feeds the unusual high private spendings in pharmaceutical R&D to a larger extend
than in other industries.
Firstly, the costs required to reach a marketable product are very high as the out-
come of research is highly uncertain and regulations are stringent for good reason,
especially for ethical drugs. The process towards a new drug can be divided into
five stages, starting with the pre-clinical attempt to isolate molecules with promising
mechanisms of action. Such will be tested on animals and pursued further in search
of a formulation adequate for testing on humans. If permitted, the substance can
enter the first of three clinical trail phases with a small group of subjects. Going on,
in Phases II and III the group of subjects is widened and especially blinded tests
are conducted. This means that at least two panels of patients are considered which
either take the new drug or are administered with a placebo or alternative drug.
The goal is to identify safety of the drug, tolerance with patients and the efficacy
to treat the targeted disease. Marketing approval for specific indications depends
on this drug profile and is decided upon by relevant institutions such as U.S. Food
and Drug Administration. In most cases the testing continues in so called Phase IV
studies. These further determine the profile given the patients health condition or
focus on extending the indications. At each of these stages a failure of new substance
is likely. Especially at late stages such a failure is very costly, since much has been
invested during the earlier stages.
Secondly, imitation is relatively cheap. Given the above described multiple research
stages and keeping in mind that failure might take place even at the late stages the
development of substance with known properties is not risky. Additionally, manu-
facturers of a generic drug are not obliged to satisfy the same approval criteria as
the original drug and pass the three clinical stages, irrespective of biological drugs
and biosimilars.
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4.2. Alternatives
As we have seen above there are two sides to the coin of a general patent mechanism.
Patents create incentives for innovation, but these incentives do not fully reflect the
social need, especially with regards to the enhancement of already patented innova-
tions. Additionally, the problems of patent race, reverse engineering and Anticom-
mons intensify the ineffectiveness of the regime. Apart from the push approach to
fund research directly there are numerous proposals for alternative pull mechanisms
of which we discuss a selection below.
4.2.1. Patent Buyout Mechanism
A possible way to address some pitfalls of patent protection is to use so called patent
buy-outs. For this purpose Kremer (1998) designs a mechanism that does not violate
the innovators property rights and makes the bidders reveal their valuation of the
monopoly value. The real private value of an invention is difficult to determine, but
bidders in a sealed-bid second-price auction are assumed to obtain at least some
information about the private value of the invention.
Thereafter either the government will buy-out the patent at a certain markup to
the observed private value, or the highest bidder purchases the patent with a small
probability p. Therewith the bidders have an incentive to reveal their valuations
and the markup by the government is chosen to reflect the typical ratio between the
social and private value of an invention. Kremer (1998) suggests a markup of at
least two, based on empirical estimates which find a social return on R&D ranging
from 50% to 270%. Even though the markup will most likely not meet the real social
value it is generally a better estimation of it than the private value. This markup is
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of some importance for the mechanism as will be depicted below.
However, this mechanism encounters a couple of problems that Kremer (1998) ad-
dresses and which will be depicted in the following. Obviously the inventor might
have an information advantage, but additionally anticipated buy-outs could inhibit
current research. The effects of an inventors production costs advantage, which Kre-
mer (1998) discusses, are ignored here since with regards to drugs production costs
are relatively small.
Adverse Selection Even though the potential bidders for the patent are mostly
competitors in the pharmaceutical market, they are likely to only have a fraction of
the innovators information available and valuations will thus differ. For example they
could understand the true value of the patent being distributed uniformly between
a lower and upper bound L and U . If the bid B wins and the patent is sold at the
price B then the upper bound of the true private value becomes min(U,B) and a
classical adverse selection problem shuts down the market.
If the government offers a markup M , the bidder does not want to win with MB > U ,
conditional on winning with the bid B, so that in equilibrium
B = L+ min(U,MB)/2,
which implies
B = min
(
L+ U
2
,max
(
0,
L
2−M
))
.
The adverse selection thus is reduced by the markup, even in cases other than uni-
formly distributed valuation.
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Effects on Research
Kremer (1998) identifies and addresses a couple of incentive problems possibly in-
duces by a patent buy-out mechanism. Referring to models of creative destruction
Kremer argues that anticipated future research, which is subsidized by a patent
buy-out mechanism, leads to overall less research, as depicted below. Contrariwise,
complementary drugs would have an research increasing effect and patent buy-outs
for durable goods would lead to anticipated low future prices. Complements as well
as durable goods are rare in the pharmaceutical industry and thus not considered in
the following (Kremer (1998) pp. 36). Consider two complementary drugs A and B,
bidders (e.g. A) will anticipate that the other patent (B) is likely to be bought out
by the government and is put into the public domain. The private as well as social
value of the non public drug (A) is thus anticipated to be higher according to the
complement characteristics.
Subsidy Effect: Let xt be the investment in R&D at time t depending on the
subsidy to research Mt so that xt(Mt), with
δxt
δMt
> 0, and assume that future research
inhibits current ( δxt
δxt+1
< 0). The steady state of this system x∗ naturally increases in
a constant markup M but less than when considering just one period. The envelope
theorem gives the total derivative
δx∗t
δMt
=
δxt
δMt
+
δxt
δxt+1
δx∗t
δMt
⇔ δx
∗
t
δMt
=
δxt
δMt
1− δxt
δxt+1
⇒ δx
∗
t
δMt
<
δxt
δMt
,
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since the future research inhibits current ( δxt
δxt+1
< 0). In other words: Let xs be the
socially optimal investment in R&D with the markup M s solving xs = Φ(M s, xs)
and equivalently denote xp as the investment in research in the absence of patent
buy-outs. M s as well as Mp (with xs = Φ(Mp, xp) ) also reflect the ratio between
the social and the private value in a social planners or non buy-out Patent mech-
anism. Assuming that xs > xp and since δΦ
δx
< 0 in order to reach the optimal
xs = Φ(M s, xs) = Φ(Mp, xp) the socially optimal markup M s exceeds the ratio Mp
of the patent framework without buy-outs.
Substitute Effect: Additional to the inhibitive effect of patent buy-outs on current
research due to its subsidizing nature on future competition, it is likely to be put in
public domain in such a regime. Kremer (1998) clarifies this second inhibitive effect
by means of the basic inventor and follower model. Suppose that I and C are the
costs of invention and copy and the values of monopolistic and duopoly return are S
and D, respectively. Following an invention is worth it if D > C and invention pays
off only for I < D, compared to I < S if there will be no follower (D < C).
Consider the game tree in figure 4.1 for the game of inventor and follower in a patent
buy-out mechanism, in which the two are bought-out with a markup M on the bids
B(F ) as well as B(I) and are randomized successively. Private bidders value the
follower by the duopoly payoff D and accordingly the following drug is invented if
MD > C. In the case of the follower being bought out publicly, the leading drug is
worth 0 so that bidders only bid pD. Thus, invention of the leading drug is inhibited
if a follower is anticipated (MD > C) and invention costs exceed the marked up
expected payoff in this situation (MpD < I).
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Figure 4.1.: Patent buy-outs with follower but without joint randomization. Picture from
Kremer (1998) ”Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism For Encouraging Innova-
tion”’, p. 29f..
Joint Randomization:
As a possibility to address the above depicted innovation inhibiting effect Kremer
(1998) suggest to let the government buy-out and randomize the two patents jointly
after the follower enters. See figure 4.2 for Kremers joint randomization proposal
and note that bidders bid for each patent separately. Both patents are either sold to
the 2 winners auctions together or put in the public domain, whereas the markup for
the leader is not payed again if it already went through a buy-out. Identifications of
substitutes or ratings are not necessary, since jointly randomization with a non sub-
stitute does no harm. In this joint randomization process bidders value each patent
by D, the government will buy-out at MD and thus the follower (leader) invents if
MD > C (MD > I). For D > C and MD < C the depicted mechanism increases
incentives for research. Without buy-outs (compared to joint randomization) the
incentive to innovate for D > C, so that a follower enters, is D − C (compared to
MD−C).If there is no follower in either mechanism (MD < C) the incentive would
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Figure 4.2.: Patent buy-outs with follower and joint randomization. Picture from Kremer
(1998) ”Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism For Encouraging Innovation”’, p.
31f..
be S − I (compared to MS − I).
Only if the buy-out mechanism induces a follower which would not follow otherwise
(D < C < MD) and MD < S, it gives less incentives since the leader invents
when MD > I, compared to S > I in the conventional mechanism. However, this
exception is based on the assumption of one follower only, since another would reduce
the incentive to develop the first follower, etc..
Collusion and Ceiling Prices
In the above depicted patent buy-out mechanism an inventor could bribe a bidder
to increase the bid. The buy-out prize would increase, but the bribed bidder only
had to pay the bid by chances of p. Apart from the general provisions to prevent
collusion such as sealed bids, even after the auction, Kremer (1998) suggests some
approaches of which so called ”ceiling prices” are highlighted in the following.
For example a third price auction could increase the bribing effort. Additional op-
79
CHAPTER 4. DYNAMIC ASPECTS: INCENTIVES
tions are the possibility to cancel randomization, forcing innovators to provide infor-
mation about ties with an auction winner as well as the requirement for bidders to
pay a licensing fee. Additionally the commissioned government agency will not be
able to buy-out all patents due to a restricted budged and thus could choose not to
buy-out those patents with an abnormal high prize.
Apart from conventional ceiling price mechanism e.g. based on a multiple of prior
buy-out sales, Kremer (1998) draws attention to a configuration of the above de-
picted patent buy-out mechanism. Given the randomization to a private bidder with
probability p the innovator would not receive any payment if the patent is bought
out, but M
p
min(bid, pi), with pi denoting the realized profits, in the case of private
randomization. The expected payoff thus is M min(bid, pi) and could be guaranteed
by an insurance. The innovator would have to additionally and permanently bribe
the winner in order to subsidize its sales and achieve the bid times the markup.
4.2.2. The Health Impact Fund
A promising mechanisms is the ”Health Impact Fund” (HIF) as its support grows
and does not require modifications on current patent legislation. The HIF, developed
by Hollis and Pogge (2008) and promoted by the non-profit organization ”Incentives
for Global Health”, has drawn worldwide attention and is supported my academics,
politicians and non-governmental organizations. For example an HIF pilot is sup-
ported by the World Health Organization as well as the Social Democratic Party of
Germany (Social Democratic Party of Germany (2010)).
An important advantage of the HIF is that registration of products with the HIF is
optional for the innovator. For approval, the innovator has to hold a patent, commit
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to a low price at marginal costs of production and preauthorize the HIF to achieve
market clearance by means of sublicensing generic companies. Furthermore, the HIF
can deny registration if the product is not suitable. In return, a registrant will receive
an annual payment for ten years.
A proposed reward concept is to grant an innovator a share of the fixed annual HIF
payout based on the contribution to global health. The health impact assessment
required for that purpose is the crucial element of the HIF mechanism, while at
the same time a criticized weaknesses. Estimation of the incremental health impact
is a very complex task, ”but the alternative is to reward innovators on the basis
of ignorance” (Hollis and Pogge (2008), p. 9). Among others, the objectives are to
account for an improved access due to lower prices, refined therapeutic profile as well
as a reduction of infections caused by communicable diseases. In order to meet these
high aims, a major part of the HIF institution would be dedicated to the continuous
evaluation of health impacts.
In order to provide significant incentives, a long term commitment of substantial
government funding is required. Hollis and Pogge (2008) suggest an initial amount
of six billion dollars per year, segmented across countries according to their GDP.
The participating countries would in return benefit from the reduced prices.
Critique on the HIF concept mostly addresses the health impact assessment. Esti-
mating the incremental health impact is especially difficult due to the varieties in
drug latency periods or the availability of data. Additionally, the costs required for
this health impact assessment could be very high as a major part of the HIF in-
stitution would be involved. Hollis and Pogge (2008) argue that such an expensive
assessment is required to provide incentives independent from wealth. Since partici-
pation in the HIF is optional, it does not directly influence monopoly profits. More
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importantly it will attract drugs with relatively high health impact when distributed
at marginal costs, than compared to the monopoly revenues. As Hollis and Pogge
(2008) as well as Grootendorst (2009) depict, neglected diseases and those with large
externalities like vaccines would benefit from this option.
4.2.3. Advanced Market Commitments
Kremer (2001) proposes another pull mechanism in order to accelerate private R&D
investment in particular for vaccines targeting neglected diseases. This proposal
was supported by publications from Kremer and Glennerster (2004), Barder, Kre-
mer, and Williams (2006), Levine, Kremer, and Albright (2005) and Berndt et al.
(2007), recommended to the Group of Eight (G8) as well as the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation and piloted in 2007. The advanced market commitment (AMC)
mechanism aims to address two dilemmas with regard to neglected diseases. First,
time-inconsistent incentives could put prices of newly developed drug under pressure
even though the respective government initially encouraged innovators to invest in
R&D for vaccines. Since these time-inconsistencies are anticipated by innovators the
incentive to invest diminishes. Second, governments face a free-riding problem as
the benefits of novel vaccines take global dimensions. Accordingly, least developed
countries (LDC) have little incentive to unilaterally fund such development (Barder,
Kremer, and Williams (2006)). As depicted in section 6.1 these problems become in
particular crucial for compulsory licensing, which is not considered in this way by
the above authors, yet supports their reasoning.
Sponsors of AMCs would legally obligate themselves to purchase a novel drug which
achieves a predefined target product profile (TPP). This purchase could be a full
purchase commitment based on a predefined quantity of treated patients or to sub-
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sidize low prices that poor countries would pay to reach a higher price. Subsequent
to the purchase of the predefined quantity the innovator would be obliged to lower
the price or license out the production to other manufacturers. The TPP defines a
minimally acceptable profile, among others with regard to safety, vaccine serotypes
or administration (Target Product Profile (TPP) for the Advance Market Commit-
ment (AMC) for Pneumococcal Conjugate Vaccines, GAVI Secretariat (2007)). In
Figure 4.3.: Fund allocation of advanced market commitment pilot on pneumococcal vac-
cines in 2010 and 2011. The 52% remaining AMC funds are carried forward
and enriched with the additional donation by end of 2011. The source of the
graph is Annual Report 2012: Advanced Market Commitments for Pneumo-
coccal Vaccines, GAVI Secretariat (2012) p.10.
2007 an AMC pilot on pneumococcal vaccines was started and the governments of
Italy, United Kingdom, Canada, Russian Federation and Norway as well as the Bill
& Melinda Gates Foundation pledged an initial total of 1.5 billion US$ to the pro-
gram (GAVI Secretariat (2013)). By 2011 the total resources to the AMC for the
period of 2011 to 2015 rose to 7.6 billion US$. The Annual Report 2013: Advanced
Market Commitments for Pneumococcal Vaccines (GAVI Secretariat (2013)) details
that to date 70% of the supported countries planned for the introduction of vaccines
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provided by Pfizer and GlaxoSmithKline. Further, in 2010 as well as 2011 the inital
funding of 1.5 billion US$ was partially disbursed to these companies as figure 4.3
illustrates. Summarizing, the crucial element of advanced market commitments is
the credibility of promised purchases to stimulate R&D.
4.3. Conclusion
Intellectual property rights aim to provide incentives for innovation. The economic
rational behind this concept is briefly outlined in this chapter, closely following Arrow
(1962). The monopoly induced by a future patent provides high expected sales and
in consequence encourages higher investments to succeed. Arrow (1962) compares
this incentive with the investment a social planner would undertake and distinguishes
between two starting points, a competitive and a monopolistic framework. Generally,
the resulting incentive is inferior to the socially desirable and the incentive under
prior competition exceeds the monopolist’s.
There are numerous additional effects which influence the induced incentive and blur
welfare assessment as Tirole (1988) points out. To name but a few the innovative
competitor does not take into account the other competitor’s losses due to his in-
novation. With regard to drugs it is difficult for regulators to assess which drug is
novel and which a so called ”me too”, not providing any additional value. Heller
and Eisenberg (1998) explain that valuable fix dose combinations of drugs are often
not available due to the ”Tragedy of the Anticommons”, indicating costly collusion
between multiple patent holders. Additionally, positive external effects of treating
communicable diseases are neither considered by innovators nor rewarded by payers.
Nonetheless Scherer (2007) points out how important time consistent patent protec-
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tion is in particular regarding the development of pharmaceuticals, since drugs are
easy to imitate yet risky to develop.
In the second half of this chapter we discuss selected alternative mechanisms which
are designed to address some of the above diffusions.
Kremer (1998) suggest that governments buy out patents by means of an auction
in which the private value is determined. The buyout offer is optional and only
occurs with a fixed probability in order to give bidders an incentive to bid. While
achieving high access via low prices there remains a probability of monopolistic man-
ufacturers. The buy-out mechanism provides a solution to under investment in R&D,
wasteful ”me too” research and the deadweight loss due to monopolistic pricing. But
the mechanism induces a couple of problems such as research inhibiting anticipated
substitution effects as well as collusion. While Kremer (1998) suggest solutions to
those and additionally comes up with the idea of purchasing funds with regards to
developing countries later (Kremer (2002)), the political and practical feasibility is
problematic (Tirole (2006)). Even though the patent buy out mechanism would in-
crease accessibility in developing countries it seems difficult to implement, since the
buy-out price and thus costs for a developing country’s government exceeds even
the private value of the patent. Currently, developing countries do not even grant
this private value to innovators, considering compulsory licensing or the absence of
any state health insurance. Additionally, implementation of such a system appears
more difficult since just a decade ago ”TRIPS” was agreed on and is even not yet
enforce in some least developing countries. Although, feasible in developed coun-
tries the needed immense government discretion will be difficult to achieve in most
developing countries.
With the ”Health Impact Fund” (HIF) Hollis and Pogge (2008) suggests to reward
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innovation directly paying annual prizes. To gain this payment an innovator must
have licensed the HIF to pursue market clearance. The main difference to ordinary
prize funds it that no target profile is set but the value of the innovation and thus
the share of the fund payment is determined based on an health impact assessment.
This assessment is also the main point of critique as it will be a very complex task
requiring a costly evaluation.
For advanced market commitment (AMC) mechanisms proposed by Kremer (2001)
sponsors commit to fully or partially purchase drugs that achieve a predefined target
product profile. For the advanced market commitment to work the explicit financial
commitments need to be credible. This mechanism is already being employed as a
pilot on pneumococcal vaccines and two innovators developed products achieving the
minimal target product profile. Advanced market commitments aim to correct time
inconsistent developing country preferences in particular with regard to neglected
diseases.
In the next chapter we will analyze the negotiations prior the compulsory licensing
and depict why advanced market commitment are in particular relevant for compul-
sory licensing. Additionally, the depicted extensive game points out that negotiations
are an essential price reducing tool for respective governments, applying for both,
innovator as well as generic manufacture. In chapter 6 the restriction of a closed
economy is relaxed and static as well as dynamic negotiations reassessed in this
context.
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5. Dynamic Aspects: Negotiations
We demonstrate in chapter 2 that the instrument of compulsory licensing (CL) is fre-
quently considered for domestic application in developing countries. While some of
these episodes result in an actual CL, others turn out to achieve a significant price re-
duction on the monopolistic innovator’s (IV) price. If a compulsory license is granted
a private generic competitor (GC) will optimize profits and most likely not price at
production cost. We indicated in chapter 3 that for a static environment without
negotiations the competition between innovator and domestic generic manufacturer
is not perfect. Perceived quality differences and the domestic generic’s distribution
network advantage drive the generic competitive price, further increased by a royalty
based on sales. The foregoing chapter 4 briefly introduced the economic concept of
incentives based on patents and highlighted selected alternative or auxiliary mech-
anisms. This section will shed light on the dynamics of negotiations preceding CL.
While the considerations on incentives are long term, the dynamic aspect of the CL
negotiations simply roots in the sequence of price proposals and compulsory licens-
ing decision. The question discussed in the following is how negotiations influence
the outcome of CL considerations and understand the features induced by private
generic manufacturers participating in these.
We investigate the negotiations between a country’s government (G) and a multina-
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tional pharmaceutical company, innovator (IV) henceforth, by means of an extensive
game with perfect information. In particular, the innovator proposes a discounted
monopoly price in anticipation of the government’s decision about CL based on this
price. Within this simple setup we simulate the actual observation that a significant
portion of CL episodes end with a discounted innovator’s price rather than issued
CL. Further, chapter 4 points out that the long term dynamic aspect of patent
protection leads to incentives for innovation. Since these incentives depend on the
expected return it largely leaves out diseases predominantly affecting the poor, so
called neglected diseases (ND). In a closed economy this problem might be aggra-
vated by compulsory licensing usage. We find that a government is more likely to
issue compulsory licensing for drugs indicated for the treatment of neglected diseases.
If this was anticipated by an innovator the inferior incentive to develop medications
for neglected diseases is diminished further.
Subsequently, the model is expanded to capture the aspect of a domestic generic
manufacturer applying as a licensee of compulsory licensing. As a result the generic
manufacturer pursues compulsory licensing by pricing low. This leads to a generic
price either below or equal to the static duopoly pricing which could improve access
to the treatment. While the general results of the analysis are carried forward the
interaction of these players is subsequently demonstrated in an example. In partic-
ular the game is applied by utilizing the duopoly model derived in chapter 3 as an
outcome.
Chapter 6 will pick up the dynamic negotiation game again and explain why a change
in the sequence of moves as it is induced by the cumbersome process of cross border
compulsory licensing will eliminate the effect of a reduced generic price.
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5.1. Compulsory Licensing as a Threat
Before issuing a compulsory licensing, the country usually negotiates with the re-
spective innovator (IV ) about the drug’s price. In practice such negotiations might
lead to a discount on the original drug and the government refrains from CL. The
upcoming will simulate this situation in form of an extensive form negotiation game
with perfect information between a foreign research based pharmaceutical innova-
tor (IV ) and the government GC of the considered developing country.1 Generally
speaking, these two players have almost opposed preferences. While the innovator
aims to maximize profits the government seeks to maximize consumer welfare, which
is represented by minimizing full coverage costs.
In the considered dynamic negotiation game N of complete information and succes-
sive moves the players are given by i ∈ NN = {IV,G}, namely innovator and govern-
ment, respectively. Actions and order of moves are represented in the extensive form
of N in figure 5.1. IV moves first and sets a positive price pIV for the considered
branded drug. Subsequently G has the option to issue compulsory licensing (cl) or
not (¬cl). Accordingly, the player function is given by P (∅) = IV , P (pIV ) = G and
the actions at each stage are A(∅) = {pIV  [0,∞]}, A(pIV ) = {cl,¬cl}. The set
of histories HN consists only of four elements ∅, pIV , (pIV , cl), (pIV ,¬cl), including
non-terminal histories. The set terminal histories of N after the second stage is
ZN = {(pIV , cl), (pIV ,¬cl)}. Whereas from (pIV , cl) the game ends with the duopoly
situation, it results in a monopoly with (pIV ,¬cl).
1The following is a generalized model from Brebeck (2009).
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Figure 5.1.: Representation of extensive negotiation game N
For ease of interpretation the duopoly outcome is assumed as given and is not mod-
eled as another subgame. The payoff-functions ΠIV and ΠG represent the innovator’s
and government’s preferences, respectively, as a base for their decision. The inno-
vator’s revenue from monopoly is determined as ΠIV (pIV ,¬cl) = ΠMIV (pIV ), without
going into details here. If the government chooses to issue a compulsory licensing, the
innovator faces a duopoly situation represented by IV ’s payoff ΠIV (pIV , cl) = Π
D
IV .
In general, the government G focuses on welfare of domestic consumers. As a mea-
surement for consumer welfare the government is assumed to consider compensating
variation cv(pIV , pGC). This concept from Hicks (1942) measures the additional ex-
penditure for consumers, given that they have to pay a higher price but still desire to
reach the same utility level. Given an utility level u and expenditure function e one
of Hicks (1942) definitions is CV = e(p0, u)− e(p1, u), with p0 and p1 being the old
and new prices, respectively. However, measuring consumer welfare regarding drug
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price changes can be delicate due to serious consequences in (developing) countries
without any state health insurance. If the expenses are payed out of consumer’s
pockets a price increase could mean access refusal for the poor population. While
problematic, this concern can be avoided by altering the interpretation: Suppose the
government is considering to pay the drug for all needy patients who cannot afford
it. Following section 3.2 these consumers of type ΘˆRˆA are represented by α and G
would have to buy the drugs for αpIV . In case of compulsory licensing however,
G only has to pay the generics competitor duopoly price αpDGC . Accordingly, the
compensating variation is cv(pIV , p
D
GC) = αpIV − αpDGC .
Additionally, there are potential downsides of compulsory licensing from the govern-
ment’s point of view. By issuing compulsory licensing a government generally could
discourage other companies and industries from engaging in foreign direct investment
(Bird and Cahoy (2008)). Further, other countries might apply political pressure as
it happened in various compulsory licensing disputes described in sections 2.2 and
2.3. These barriers are considered in the game N as aggregated cost of compulsory
licensing −c.
Summarizing, the extensive form of game N is given by the
set of players: NN = {IV,G},
set of terminal histories: ZN = {(pIV , cl), (pIV ,¬cl)},
player function:

P (∅) = IV
P (pIV ) = G
and the
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preferences:

ΠIV (pIV ,¬cl) = ΠMIV (pIV )
ΠIV (pIV , cl) = Π
D
IV
ΠG(pIV ,¬cl) = c
ΠG(pIV , cl) = αpIV − αpDGC .
(5.1)
The following will analyze the game by using backward induction in order to describe
the set of subgame perfect equilibria. This concept is favorable over a Nash equilib-
rium in strategic form in this specific case as empty threats need to be ruled out,
following Selten (1965). For example consider the government’s strategy to issue CL
every time IV prices above production costs and IV to give in. This would be a
Nash equilibrium as no player can improve my deviating from their strategy. Yet,
this outcome is not plausible since the government’s rigorous threat is not reliable.
The second stage subgame N(pIV ) after history (pIV ) deals with the government’s
decision whether to issue compulsory licensing (cl)or not (¬cl). Consider the strategy
s∗G|pIV within this subgame
s∗G|pIV =

cl for ΠG(pIV ,¬cl) < ΠG(pIV , cl)
¬cl for ΠG(pIV ,¬cl) ≥ ΠG(pIV , cl)
The strategy s∗G|pIV is a Nash equilibrium for the subgame N(pIV ) since G cannot
obtain a better outcome by deviating, given a price pIV . It simply demands that G
decides about compulsory licensing based on the outcome. If G prefers the outcome
of CL given a price pIV it will issue CL, otherwise not. When using the outcomes
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defined in 6.4 s∗G|pIV can be written as
s∗G|pIV =

cl , for c < αpIV − αpDGC
¬cl , for c ≥ αpIV − αpDGC .
(5.2)
Stepping back into the first stage of the game we look at the subgame N(∅) in which
the innovator IV decides upon the price proposal pIV . IV anticipates G’s strategy
can influence the government’s decision by altering pIV . Consider the following
strategy s∗IV |∅. Do detain G from issuing CL IV sets the price just low enough at
pIV =
c
α
+ pDGC according to 5.2. Further, IV will only convince G of not issuing CL
if this is beneficial and decides based on the outcome. The resulting monopoly profit
ΠMIV (pIV ) with pIV =
c
α
+pDGC is compared to the duopoly given by Π
D
IV . When using
the preferences 6.4 this strategy s∗IV |∅ can then be written as
s∗IV |∅ =

pIV >
c
α
+ pDGC for Π
M
IV (pIV ) ≤ ΠDIV
pIV =
c
α
+ pDGC for Π
M
IV (pIV ) > Π
D
IV ,
(5.3)
and IV can not benefit from deviation. Accordingly, the strategy profiles s∗IV |∅
and s∗G|pIV represent a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game N (Osborne and
Rubinstein (1994)). For each of the two subgames no player can benefit by deviating
given the other player’s strategy.
In order to avoid a third case it is assumed that G is considering a CL at all. That is
c
α
+pDGC is always smaller than a monopoly optimal price before the CL negotiations.
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2
Figure 5.2.: Compulsory licensing episodes by outcome based on table 2.1
In words, the innovator could be able to avoid compulsory licensing by giving a
discount. IV will do so unless the expected payoff from a duopoly situation exceeds
the monopoly profit with discounts. In fact, a third of CL episodes between 2000 and
2012 resulted in discounts as figure 5.2 shows. For instance, consider the prehistory
of compulsory licenses in Brazil depicted in section 2.2. Before issuing CL in 2007
the Brazil government was able to negotiate price discounts on several drugs between
40% and 65% already in 2001. Among all 43 CL episodes figure 5.2 and table 2.1
demonstrate that 14 negotiations were settled by discounts, at least for a while.
Table 5.1 gives details of the CL episondes in table 2.1. While for the South African
discounts no values are avilable, the remaining 8 examples show how significant
these discounts are. The second aspect deducible from 5.3 is how the pressure on
IV changes for diseases that affect predominantly the poor population α. If this
2Note that the preferences of government can also be written as ΠG(pIV ,¬cl) = c − αpIV and
ΠG(pIV , cl) = −αpDGC and yield the same results. However, the interpretation would be that
the government will buy the drug from IV if no compulsory licensing is issued. This would also
mean that the profit of IV becomes bigger due to the additional sales for consumers of type
ΘˆRˆA, measured by α.
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Table 5.1.: Compulsory licensing episodes with discount outcomes. The 100% discount
(row 14) of Novartis on imatinip is restricted to households with income per
year of less than 1.7 million baht only. Sources are Beall and Kuhn (2012a),
Wetzler and Ayala (2008) and Wetzler and Palmedo (2008).
population increases IV is less likely to offer a price that would avoid compulsory
licensing. Above all, the government can achieve the highest compensating variation
for diseases that affect the poor population and is thus willing to accept the costs of
compulsory licensing c easily. While this finding is in line with general understanding
of a governments’ objectives and thus induced by the assumption of compensating
variation, figure 5.3 supports this as the majority of compulsory licensing episodes
applies to HIV drugs. Additionally compulsory licensing for drugs is widely accepted
and the costs c of utilizing CL might be lower. Another incentive for the government
to issue compulsory licensing which is not factored in the compensating variation
is the aspect of communicable diseases. By treating a communicable disease and
containing a potential further spread future treatment costs are reduced.
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Figure 5.3.: Compulsory licensing episodes by disease group based on table 2.1
From IV’s point of view the likelihood of compulsory licensing differs across ther-
apeutic areas. For potent products targeting neglected diseases (ND) the risk of
encountering compulsory licensing is higher than for others. If this is anticipated by
multinational pharmaceutical companies the high risk of CL inhibits investment in
research and development for new drugs related to these diseases as well as costly
improvements. Summarizing, diseases desperate for attention and private investment
are burdened with an additional barrier to research and development investment. For
a closed economy a CL heavy policy will thus have further negative impact on the
treatment options of ND and should be avoided by a long term oriented government.
5.2. Generic Competitor as an Applicant
While the above model demonstrates the negotiation between innovator and govern-
ment, it assumes a given duopoly outcome in case of compulsory licensing.
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Figure 5.4.: Representation of extensive application game A
If however, the government did not commit to issue compulsory licensing a generic
competitor has to apply with price pAGC and convince the government to do so. This
changes the specified game N (figure 5.1) to the new game A with the extensive
form depicted in figure 5.4. In game A the generic competitor submits the price pAGC
simultaneously to IV proposing the negotiation price pIV . It is fundamental here
that while IV can change the price again for a duopoly situation, GC has to stick
to pAGC so that p
D
GC = p
A
GC from the above specified game N . Note that in the set
of histories HA the prices of GC and IV are denoted together and consist of the
elements ∅, {pIV , pAGC}, ({pIV , pAGC}, cl), ({pIV , pAGC},¬cl).
The game A in extensive form is thus defined as
set of players: NA = {GC, IV,G},
set of terminal histories: ZA = {({pIV , pAGC}, cl), ({pIV , pAGC},¬cl)},
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player function:

P (∅) = {IV,GC}
P ({pIV , pAGC}) = G
and the
preferences:

ΠGC({pIV , pAGC},¬cl) = 0
ΠGC({pIV , pAGC}, cl) = ΠDGC(pAGC)
ΠIV ({pIV , pAGC},¬cl) = ΠMIV (pIV )
ΠIV ({pIV , pAGC}, cl) = ΠDIV (pAGC)
ΠG({pIV , pAGC},¬cl) = c
ΠG({pIV , pAGC}, cl) = αpIV − αpAGC .
(5.4)
In order to find the subgame perfect equilibrium we separate the game A into two
subgames, namely A(∅) and A({pIV , pAGC}). Using backward induction we focus
on A({pIV , pAGC}) as a first step and note that essentially not much changed from
the governments perspective. As in game N and the respective subgame N(pIV )
the optimal strategy remains to issue CL only if the outcome is higher than the
monopoly situation with negotiated price pIV . The optimal strategy s
∗
G|({pIV ,pAGC})
remains equivalent to 5.3 only taking into account the new application price pAGC of
GC, so that
s∗G|({pIV ,pAGC}) =

cl , for c < αpIV − αpAGC
¬cl , for c ≥ αpIV − αpAGC .
(5.5)
The strategy s∗G|({pIV ,pAGC}) is Nash equilibrium in the subgame A({pIV , pAGC}) given
the prices pIV and p
A
GC as the government cannot benefit by deviating.
Moving backwards to the first stage subgame A(∅) the next question is how IV
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and GC will set their prices in full knowledge of the governments decision process
5.5. In particular both players have opposed preferences. While IV strives to avoid
compulsory licensing, GC aims to convince G of issuing it. Essentially, the strategy
for IV 5.3 remains optimal, only adjusted for the new price pAGC that IV has to deal
with in a duopoly situation. It is still an optimal strategy for IV to only convince G
of compulsory licensing if doing so is beneficial and thus ΠMIV (
c
α
+ pAGC) > Π
D
IV (p
A
GC).
Accordingly,
s∗IV |∅ =

pIV >
c
α
+ pAGC for Π
M
IV (
c
α
+ pAGC) ≤ ΠDIV (pAGC)
pIV =
c
α
+ pAGC for Π
M
IV (
c
α
+ pAGC) > Π
D
IV (p
A
GC).
(5.6)
The generic competitor moves at the same time as IV and is aware of G’s decision
strategy 5.5, as well. Suppose GC acts based on the following strategy. If beneficial,
GC strives to achieve the opposite of IV and sets a price that will convince G to
issue CL. This can be done by pricing just under the threshold of pAGC < pIV − cα .
This move is beneficial if undercutting the threshold of G yields a positive profit
given the price needed to do this, thus ΠDGC(pIV − cα−ε) > 0. The described strategy
is written as
sGC |∅ =

pAGC ≥ pIV − cα for ΠDGC(pIV − cα − ε) ≤ 0
pAGC = pIV − cα − ε for ΠDGC(pIV − cα − ε) > 0.
with the arbitrarily small positive number ε.
Yet this strategy is not the optimal choice in all situations. Suppose that pD∗GC is the
unique optimal price which GC would set in the absence of any negotiations. Assume
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further that the profit is continuously increasing in pGC for pGC < pD∗GC but decreasing
for pGC > pD∗GC . If the price required to undercut the threshold is still higher than this
duopoly price (pIV − cα − ε > pD∗GC) it is not optimal. GC could obtain a higher profit
by pricing at pD∗GC while still convincing G of compulsory licensing. Accordingly, the
optimal strategy for GC is
s∗GC |∅ =

pAGC ≥ pIV − cα for ΠDGC(pIV − cα − ε) ≤ 0
pAGC = pIV − cα − ε
for ΠDGC(pIV − cα − ε) > 0
and pIV − cα − ε ≤ pD∗GC
pAGC = p
D∗
GC
for ΠDGC(pIV − cα − ε) > 0
and pIV − cα − ε > pD∗GC .
(5.7)
Summarizing the optimal strategies s∗GC |∅, s∗IV |∅ and s∗G|({pIV ,pAGC}) define a subgame
perfect equilibrium.
The question remains which player will come out on top and if G will issue compul-
sory licensing as a result. From the optimal strategies s∗IV |∅ 6.1 and s∗GC |∅ 5.7 we get
the following conditions
ΠMIV (
c
α
+ pAGC) > Π
D
IV (p
A
GC), (5.8)
ΠDGC(pIV −
c
α
− ε) > 0 and (5.9)
pIV − c
α
− ε ≤ pD∗GC , (5.10)
under which they are perfectly opposed. While IV aims to prevent compulsory
licensing by pricing at pIV =
c
α
+ pAGC , the applicant GC aims for the opposite with
pAGC = pIV − cα − ε. Ignore condition 5.10 for now as it demands that GC prices even
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lower if unmet.
Within the boundaries of 5.8 and 5.9 no pricing equilibrium exists and figuratively
speaking both competitors undercut each other’s prices until one of them opts out.
For a price equilibrium neither of the parties can benefit from changing their prices.
Accordingly, either IV decides that decreasing the price further leads to a monopoly
profit lower than for a duopoly (5.8) or GC cannot decrease the price further without
suffering losses (5.9). Which equilibrium occurs depends on the costs of compulsory
licensing c, the indication type α, production costs c as well as the expectations
about royalty rate r.
However, we can summarize the different outcomes into three possible equilibrium
categories. In one of these possibilities IV is able to lower the price pIV sufficiently
without GC being able to prevent G from abandoning CL efforts by pricing lower
than pIV − cα . Then, G refrains from compulsory licensing, IV gives a discount,
GC is not able to enter the market. Intuitively, higher costs of compulsory licensing
for G promote this type of outcome. Another possible equilibrium occurs if GC is
able to set a price at which IV is not willing to avoid CL, just at pAGC that leads
to ΠMIV (
c
α
+ pAGC) ≤ ΠDIV (pAGC). The third alternative appears to be pedantic, yet is
essential for the upcoming analysis in chapter 6. If the optimal duopoly price pD∗GC
for GC is lower than the price necessary to defy IV , GC will choose pD∗GC .
As a consequence, the generic price resulting from negotiations in form of the model
above will always be smaller than or equal the duopoly pricing of GC without any
negotiations.
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5.3. Application of Discrete Asymmetric Demand
Model
The above results are mainly subject to assumptions with regard to the negotiating
game model and only few relate to any characteristics of demand, specifically the
duopoly situation. The following will implement the discrete asymmetric duopoly
model introduced in chapter 3 within the negotiation game in order to visualize the
results and clarify. Most notably, while the upcoming application imposes further
assumptions the general results from above are taken forward to the next chapter 6.
For the discrete asymmetric duopoly model we can express the profit functions of
IV (3.16) and GC (3.17) in case of CL as
Π˜IV (p˜IV , p˜GC) = (1− α˜)(1 + p˜GC − p˜IV )(p˜IV − vc)
+ (1− α˜)rp˜GC(p˜IV − p˜GC) + α˜rp˜GC and
Π˜GC(p˜IV , p˜GC) = (1− α˜)(p˜IV − p˜GC)((1− r)p˜GC − vc)
+ α˜((1− r)p˜GC − vc)
by using the urban demand functions 3.3, 3.2 and assuming full coverage of rural
area in case of CL. While GC applies for CL with pAGC and is required to retain it,
IV can set a new price. This optimal pricing of IV as a response to GC pricing pAGC
is
Π˜IV = (1− α˜)(1 + p˜GC − p˜IV )(p˜IV − vc)
+ (1− α˜)rp˜GC(p˜IV − p˜GC) + α˜rp˜GC
⇒ 0 = (1− α˜)(1 + (1 + r)p˜GC + vc− 2p˜IV )
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⇒ p˜DIV (p˜GC) =
1 + vc+ (1 + r)p˜GC
2
.
This result is similar to 3.18 in which α = 0 was assumed, because IV does not
have influence on rural area demand. Inserting the optimal response price p˜DIV in the
profit functions of IV and GC results in long terms which are expressed as Π˜DIV (p˜
A
GC)
and Π˜DGC(p˜
A
GC) henceforth. Here, p˜
A
GC is GC’s application price and not the optimal
duopoly price. Summarizing, the preferences of game A change and the new game
A˜ is defined as:
set of players: NA˜ = {GC, IV,G},
set of terminal histories: ZA˜ = {({pIV , pAGC}, cl), ({pIV , pAGC},¬cl)},
player function:

P (∅) = IV,GC
P ({pIV , pAGC}) = G
and the
preferences:

ΠGC({pIV , pAGC},¬cl) = 0
ΠGC({pIV , pAGC}, cl) = Π˜DGC(p˜AGC)
ΠIV ({pIV , pAGC},¬cl) = (1− α)(pIV − vc)
ΠIV ({pIV , pAGC}, cl) = Π˜DIV (p˜AGC)
ΠG({pIV , pAGC},¬cl) = c
ΠG({pIV , pAGC}, cl) = αp˜IV − αp˜AGC .
(5.11)
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show the profit ofGC if compulsory licensing is issued (Π˜DGC(p˜
A
GC))
in dependence of the application price p˜AGC . Further, the figures show IV ’s profit in
the case of duopoly (Π˜DIV (p˜
A
GC)) and monopoly (Π˜
M
IV (
c
α
+ p˜AGC)). The latter can be
displayed in dependence of pAGC as well, when undercutting pIV =
c
α
+ p˜AGC so that
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G refrains from issuing compulsory licensing.
Figure 5.5.: Example of game A˜ with outcome no CL: Profit functions of GC and IV in
dependence of pAGC for parameters C = 0.1, vc = 0.2, r = 0.05 and α = 0.35
While the curves in figure 5.5 are given for the exemplary values of C = 0.1, vc = 0.2,
r = 0.05 and α = 0.35, figure 5.5 only differs in terms of α = 0.5. In the scenario
of figure 5.5 (α = 0.35) the innovator IV is able to benefit from undercutting even
the lowest prices p˜AGC that GC would set with positive non negative profit. Consider
p˜AGC ≈ 0.21 which results in zero profit for GC: Here IV is still able to achieve more
profit from undercutting this price with p˜IV =
c
α
+ p˜AGC than by accepting compulsory
licensing. As a result IV proposes just this price which makes it impossible for GC
to successfully convince GC of CL while still achieving profit, G accepts and refrains
from issuing CL. In figure 5.5 on the other hand, we are looking at a therapeutic
area more directed towards the poor population in rural areas and thus with a higher
α = 0.5. In this case the G will issue CL since GC is able to price at a level for which
IV refrains from undercutting. This demonstrates that for higher α compulsory
licensing becomes more likely. Increasing the costs C of compulsory licensing for G
on the other hand decreases the probability of CL by shifting Π˜MIV (
c
α
+ p˜AGC) sideways
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and making it easier for IV to undercut with pIV =
c
α
+ p˜AGC .
Figure 5.6.: Example of game A˜ with outcome CL: Profit functions of GC and IV in
dependence of pAGC for parameters C = 0.1, vc = 0.2, r = 0.05 and α = 0.5
5.4. Conclusion
After having discussed static compulsory licensing duopoly pricing in chapter 3 we
pursued the question which effect negotiations have in this chapter. As a first step
we depict a dynamic negotiation game with perfect information in extensive form
and model the widely observed discounts resulting from CL negotiations. In a second
step this game is extended to account for the fact that potential licensees apply for
CL with their price. As a result the licensee’s price could be lower compared to the
profit maximizing duopoly choice. This is an important finding because it shows
that negotiations with both, innovator as well as private generic manufacturer are
the key element for governments to ensure access via low generic prices.
These findings are fully supported by the well documented case of compulsory li-
censing in India for the drug Nexavar in March 2012. It shows that the domestic
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generic competitor Natco Pharma Limited applied for CL with a low price to con-
vince the government of CL. As detailed in the decision (Government of India (2012))
this price and the estimated access to the drug compared to Bayer’s pricing was the
main driver for the positive decision. What makes this decision unique in the context
of our analysis is that prior to the CL, Cipla Limited, another domestic manufacturer
effectively already created a duopoly by selling a counterfeit, unauthorized drug. The
converted price of $ 600 monthly for this drug apparently marks the optimal duopoly
price from Cipla’s point of view, given the structure of demand and Bayer’s price of
$ 5,600 monthly. While $ 600 is the price of choice without negotiations, Natco ap-
plied with a price of $ 180 per month for CL. We cannot assess if this price is driven
be application considerations, competitive pricing versus Cipla or a composition of
both. However, note that Natco fixed this price while being fully aware of Bayer’s
filed infringement suit against Cipla.
Summarizing, there is space for domestic generic manufacturers to decrease the price
for a CL application compared to the profit maximizing duopoly price, if necessary.
Companies will do so in order to convince a government of compulsory licensing. One
could argue that the government’s preferences might not be common knowledge and
in particular the costs of compulsory licensing are unknown. However, in this case
price reductions influence the likelihood of compulsory licensing from the generic’s
point of view.
Note that negotiations with a domestic generic manufacturer are unnecessary for
government owned manufacturers as it was the case for CL episodes in Brazil. Fur-
ther, the application concept only holds if the respective government did not commit
to compulsory licensing prior to negotiations. This case will be at the center of
discussion when we relax the restriction of a closed economy in the next chapter.
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6. Open Economy
The foregoing analysis looked at the compulsory licensing instrument from different
angles and in each chapter we focus on a single mechanic by fading out others. In
this chapter all findings and mechanisms are brought together to form a big picture.
The compulsory licensing instrument concedes members of the World Trade Organi-
zation a derogation to harmonized patent protection. In individual cases countries
are allowed to compulsory license (CL) a generic manufacturer with the production
and marketing of a patented product. In this case a duopoly is established in which
the innovator’s (IV) product is perceived as superior in quality and the domestic
generic competitor (GC) benefits from an extensive distribution network. Accord-
ingly, we conclude from chapter 3 that the competition is not perfect and prices
remain above marginal costs. Further, the royalty increases in the licensee’s price
depending on the marginal costs and the degree of competition. Yet, chapter 5 de-
picts that the generic manufacturer applies for compulsory licensing and pricing is
driven by the goal to persuade compulsory licensing rather than the static duopoly
situation. This finding does only hold if the country did not commit to compulsory
licensing prior to price negotiations. Additionally, compulsory licensing usage could
lead to reduced incentives for research in affected therapeutic areas such as neglected
diseases due to anticipation of investors in a closed economy.
107
CHAPTER 6. OPEN ECONOMY
In this chapter we ask how these findings turn out when we dispense with the re-
striction of a closed economy. Furthermore selected alternatives and enhancements
are discussed and compared in light of the identified problems.
6.1. Free Riding, Differential Pricing and Parallel
Imports
One of the results from the foregoing chapter 5 is that CL is more likely to be
issued for drugs targeting neglected diseases (ND) and communicable diseases than
for others. This impacts the expected return of research and development projects
in such therapeutic areas and adds to the already reduced efforts due to the low out
of pocket purchasing power of the affected poor population. From a closed economy
perspective a CL heavy strategy on these diseases is not welfare efficient in the long
run as it probably reduces the treatment options.
Relaxing the restriction of closed economy and roughly segmenting the world into
developed and developing nations does revise this trade off between long term and
short term considerations. For global diseases the required profits to motivate re-
search and development (R&D) can usually be made in developed countries alone
and the return from selling drugs in developing countries plays a minor role in an
investment decision. For ND the situation is reversed but profits from developing
countries do not motivate large R&D investments. Extensive CL usage for NDs
will diminish even these investment incentives and reduce treatment options in the
long run. Thus, for developing countries as one entity CL might possibly not lead
to higher welfare in the long run and other methods of providing access should be
applied. Yet, a classic free rider dilemma arises and an individual sufficiently small
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developing country might benefit from stepping out of line and pursue a CL policy
for NDs.
A contractual commitment to refrain from CL usage for specific therapeutic areas
would reduce risks of investment and increase private R&D for NDs. In order to
improve access and ensure funding an option is to reimburse patented drugs for ND
while applying CL on medications targeting global diseases. If developing coun-
tries contribute to improve the return of pharmaceutical R&D investment it should
be for neglected domestic diseases, rather than for global diseases. At this point
the advanced market commitment (AMC) mechanism introduced in section 4.2.3
gains additional importance. Donator countries or even LDC themselves commit to
purchase novel drugs that achieve a predefined target product profile for neglected
diseases. This way the anticipated likely compulsory licensing policy would be re-
covered by reliable contractual commitments. The AMC mechanism is designed to
correct free-rider dilemma and the time inconsistencies which hinder innovation by
anticipated ex post price pressure and compulsory licensing for neglected diseases.
While publications by Kremer and Glennerster (2004) or Berndt et al. (2007) do not
consider that compulsory licensing is more likely for neglected diseases this analysis
strengthens their argumentation and emphasis the need for further deployment of
the AMC tool.
With regard to access, a segmentation of target countries and differential pricing
is feasible and could even be maximizing the return of investment (World Health
Organization (2001), p. 3.) for innovators. Hence, prices in developing countries
should be significantly lower than prices in developed countries. Yet, there are serious
obstacles that prohibit global pharmaceutical companies from conducting efficient
differential pricing even tough it would most probably increase total welfare.
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Some countries use a so called ”reference price system” when setting upper price
limits or reimbursement policies. This means, for instance, that a government using
such a system will not reimburse a certain drug if the price is higher than in another
country. Hence pharmaceutical companies might decide to price higher in relatively
small markets in order to push up the price for the drug in the major markets. This
effect is not only restricted to implemented systems but additionally impacts price
negotiations in general. For example consider the Brazil price negotiations in the
context of CL for Efavirenz as detailed in section 2.2. The CL was issued because
the innovator MSD did not lower its price for the drug to the same level as it did
after the CL negotiations in Thailand. Summarizing, a relatively low price in one
country potentially influences the reimbursed price in other countries, which deters
differential pricing.
Another factor that hinders differential pricing are so called parallel imports, also
referred to as gray trade. While patents concede the right to exclude others from
selling a product to the patent holder this right is exhausted upon initial sale within
the country (A). As a result the patent holder loses control over the product and it
can be redistributed by the new possessor in A. The question if this product can be
sold in another country (B) depends on B’s legislation and exhaustion regime. In case
of national exhaustion the right to exclude others is only exhausted on a national
level, not applying to the country B. Accordingly, the possessor cannot resell the
product in B without the right holder’s approval. If B uses a system of international
exhaustion it considers the right to exclude others as exhausted internationally and
allows the import for sale. Note that parallel trade is possible to B regardless of
the exhaustion system in A. As an example members of the European Union apply
a doctrine of international exhaustion with regard to other member countries, yet
national exhaustion is applied for countries outside of EU. Parallel trade from country
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A to country B could force the prices in B down if the innovator of a drug does not
bind its manufacturers in A to relatively equivalent prices(Tirole (2006)). Innovators
anticipating parallel trade might decide to refrain from differential pricing and protect
sales in high income countries.
While the above described factors of reference pricing systems and parallel trade
inhibit price differential pricing they potentially also hinder price negotiations related
to compulsory licensing. Suppose these concerns from an innovator’s point of view
can be expressed as a function G(pIV ) of the negotiated price. Then, the preferences
5.4 from game A depicted in section 5.2 become
ΠIV ({pIV , pAGC},¬cl) = ΠMIV (pIV )−G(pIV ).
Consequentially, the strategy s∗IV |∅ needs to be adjusted to
s∗IV |∅ =

pIV >
c
α
+ pAGC for Π
M
IV (
c
α
+ pAGC)−G( cα + pAGC) ≤ ΠDIV (pAGC)
pIV =
c
α
+ pAGC for Π
M
IV (
c
α
+ pAGC)−G( cα + pAGC) > ΠDIV (pAGC),
(6.1)
in order to be subgame perfect. This means that government and innovator are less
likely to come to an agreement. Additionally, the generic competitor’s application
price pAGC increases. Importantly, the relation of Π
M
IV (pIV ) within the country and
costs of price reduction outside the country −G(pIV ) is less favorable for LDC.
6.2. Cross Border Compulsory Licensing
Before the Doha declaration in 2001 the WTO permitted compulsory licensing for do-
mestic use only. Hence, least developed countries (LDC) without the infrastructure
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to produce drugs with sufficient quality were not able to benefit from the compul-
sory licensing provision.1. If the drug was under patent for all other countries, there
would no possibility to import the drug even though the LDC issued compulsory
licensing. This changed when 2001 the WTO ministerial conference in Doha allowed
compulsory licensing for export. Cross border compulsory licensing (CBCL) be-
came possible if both countries, the exporting nation as well as the importing LDC,
issue compulsory licensing. Yet, CBCL was used only once when the Canadian
generic manufacturer Apotex exported the antiretroviral triple combination Zidovu-
dine, Lamivudine and Nevirapine to Rwanda in 2008. From the documentation of
this case, amongst others by Apotex (2008), Weber and Mills (2010) or Kyle and
McGahan (2011), we know that the process was very cumbersome. Yet, complexity
in the application or a time consuming process as detailed in section 2.3 should not
prevent countries of CBCL, especially if supported by organizations such as Me´decins
Sans Frontie`res (MSF) or the Clinton Foundation.
Two important issues stand out even though both apply for any country which
considers compulsory licensing, capable of domestic production or not. First of
all there are barriers to compulsory licensing in form of pressure from innovators,
investors or countries. However, this did not prevent multiple other compulsory
licenses so the question remains why CBCL usage should be prevented. Secondly,
Apotex (2008) and Weber and Mills (2010) report that countries are reluctant to self-
identify at an early stage of the cross border compulsory licensing process. Again,
all countries that issue compulsory licensing self-identify eventually, which is the
point when the costs of pressure from innovators or governments trigger. It remains
unclear why exactly LDC are unlikely to utilize CBCL while generally compulsory
licensing is frequently used.
1The abbreviation LDC used henceforth refers to these countries
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Recall that India does not register patents for drugs introduced before 2005 and
thus can export older products without CL. A number of LDC issued CL for drugs
not under patent in India and imported them. Let us call such import compulsory
licensing (ICL) in contrast to domestic compulsory licensing (DCL) with domestic
production. This is not CBCL as refereed to by the Doha declaration as it requires
two compulsory licenses.
The upcoming will depict two concrete disadvantages that CBCL has over DCL as
well as ICL. We show that the incentive to issue CBCL is inferior to the incentive
for DCL or ICL. Firstly, the focus lies on the static duopoly already discussed in
chapter 3 and transportation costs, which occur for CBCL as well as ICL. These
costs do not only add to the marginal cost of the licensee’s product but additionally
increase the cost amplified effect of royalty on price. For ICL and DCL however,
the generic optimal duopoly price is overwritten by the application price a generic
manufacturer bids to convince a government of compulsory licensing. A LDC has to
self identify at an early stage of a cumbersome and time consuming CBCL process
and thus commit to compulsory licensing prior to negotiations. Still, a potential
licensee has to convince the LDC of CL, but not under consideration of barriers.
These barriers are already teared down by the LDC by engaging in CL negotiations
in the first place and persuading CL. Hence, the costs of CL can be regarded as sunk
costs in a negotiation process.
6.2.1. Royalty and Cross Border Compulsory Licensing
The WTO TRIPs agreement regulates that the generic licensee is obligated to trans-
fer a remuneration to the innovator if compulsory licensing is issued. Height and
character of this remuneration is determined by the respective national government.
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As discussed in chapter 3.3, these remunerations are almost exclusively low royalties
based on net generic sales.
Following the Doha declaration these remunerations are payed for by the exporting
firm in case of CBCL (World Trade Organization (2003)). Additionally, the export
of goods is usually costly in terms of transportation costs. Suppose transportation t
costs can be broken down to single units and increase in the number. In accordance
with 3.9 the exporting licensee’s objective function hence becomes
ΠGC = DGC(pGC , pIV )((1− r)pGC − vc− t), (6.2)
with IV ’s price pIV , GC’s price pIV alias the licensee, transportation and variable
costs vc + t and royalty r per sales. We assume here that the product in the target
country is either distributed by the same exporting company or by the government
without price increase. Profit maximization leads to the optimal price
p∗GC =
DGC(pGC , pIV )
−∂DGC(pGC ,pIV )
∂pGC
+
vc+ t
1− r , or
⇔ p∗GC =
DGC(pGC , pIV )
−∂DGC(pGC ,pIV )
∂pGC
+ vc+ t+ (vc+ t)
r
1− r , (6.3)
with the royalty amplification effect t r
1−r as well as the direct effect of t on the
price p∗GC . Summarizing, the effect of the royalty on the generic price is higher than
expected. As discussed in chapter 5 the duopoly optimal price and hence these effects
could be overwritten by negotiations.
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6.2.2. Negotiations and Cross Border Compulsory Licensing
For DCL as well as ICL the generic competitor approaches the government and
automatically triggers a predefined process, while the outcome is open. The respec-
tive compulsory licensing episode could close with a discount, voluntary licensing,
compulsory licensing or no action. Generic manufacturer (GC) and innovator (IV )
negotiate with the government (G) simultaneously. Ultimately G comes to a decision
based on the proposed prices pIV ,p
A
GC and the costs of compulsory licensing c. As
demonstrated in the extensive game A with perfect information this could lead to
reduced pricing. In particular the applicant GC aims to convince G of issuing CL
with a low price pAGC while IV counters in a bargaining downward spiral.
Figure 6.1.: Representation of extensive commitment game C
For CBCL the sequence of moves differs and an importing country self-identifies at
an early stage (Apotex (2008) or Weber and Mills (2010)). By reaching out to foreign
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exporters the respective country shows the world that it is willing to issue compulsory
licensing and effectively annul intellectual property rights. If CL is not issued in the
end it is not because the respective LDC refrains from doing so. The only question
which remains is if a suitable generic manufacturer can be found capable of exporting
from a country willing to a issue a CL as well.
Consider the extensive form game C represented in figure 6.1. Essentially the game C
is similar to the game A but with the generic competitor GC included. In the game C
we look at the three players innovator (IV ), government (G) and generic competitor
(GC). As a start IV sets the price pIV on which G reacts with the decision to reach
out and pursue CL pcl or not ¬pcl. We assume here that if G decides to pursue
compulsory licensing a generic competitor will be found from a country willing to
issue compulsory licensing for this purpose. This assumption is not problematic since
many WTO members have a legislation in place similar to the Canadian ”Access to
Medicines” Regime, for example in the EU or USA (Government of Canada (2006)
Annex B). If G decides to accept IV ’S price no CL is issued and the game ends.
IV ’s profit in that case is defined as ΠMIV (pIV ) in dependence of the price pIV priorly
offered. By declaring the negotiations with IV as collapsed and pursuing CL the
respective LDC triggers the costs −c of CL. At this point a duopoly subgame unfolds
which does not need to be detailed for the purpose of this analysis. The outcomes
are given by IV ’s profit ΠDIV (p
D
IV , p
D
GC), GC’s profit Π
D
GC(p
D
GC , p
D
IV ) and G preferences
αpIV − αpDGC .
Summarizing, the game C in extensive form is defined as
set of players: NC = {IV,G,GC},
set of terminal histories: ZC = {(pIV , pcl, pDGC , pDIV ), (pIV ,¬pcl, pDGC , pDIV )},
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player function:

P (∅) = IV
P (pIV ) = G
P (pIV , pcl) = {GC, IV }
and the
preferences:

ΠIV (pIV ,¬pcl) = ΠMIV (pIV )
ΠIV (pIV , pcl, p
D
GC , p
D
IV ) = Π
D
IV (p
D
IV , p
D
GC)
ΠGC(pIV ,¬cl) = 0
ΠGC(pIV , pcl, p
D
GC , p
D
IV ) = Π
D
GC(p
D
GC , p
D
IV )
ΠG(pIV ,¬cl) = c
ΠG(pIV , pcl, p
D
GC , p
D
IV ) = αpIV − αpDGC .
(6.4)
To exclude empty threads as well as empty promises we look at subgame perfect
equilibria and use backward induction. This means that the outcome of the duopoly
is derived within this very subgame only. Without going into detail with the duopoly
situation we assume subgame perfect strategies for both players IV and GC
s∗IV |pIV ,pcl = pD∗IV (pDGC)
s∗GC |pIV ,pcl = pD∗GC(pDIV ).
We write the equilibrium prices as pD∗IV and p
D∗
IV . Note here, that GC does not take
into account any considerations of G. GC sets the optimal price given the duopoly
demand situation, royalties as well as IV ’s price pDIV . These optimal prices p
D∗
IV and
pD∗IV denote a subgame perfect equilibrium as neither GC nor IV can benefit from
deviation. The resulting price accordingly is always higher or equals the application
price pAIV .
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Yet, stepping back one stage to the subgame C(pIV ) the government G anticipates
this price and decides about compulsory licensing. This decision is based on the
subgame perfect equilibrium price pD∗IV and the proposed monopoly price pIV resulting
from the first stage of game C. Similar to game N and A it remains G’s optimal
strategy to issue CL only if it the outcome is higher than for the monopoly situation,
taking into account the costs. Accordigly, the strategy
s∗G|pIV =

pcl , for c < αpIV − αpD∗GC
¬pcl , for c ≥ αpIV − αpD∗GC
(6.5)
gives G’s subgame perfect equilibrium strategy.
Moving further backwards leads us to the subgame C(∅) in which IV proposes the
monopoly price. IV anticipates G’s strategy and sets pIV in accordance. For a
strategy to be subgame perfect IV will use a lowered price pIV to prevent CL only
as long as this is profitable so that ΠMIV (pIV ) > Π
D
IV . In order to do that IV will
price just under the threshold pIV =
c
α
+ pD∗GC . Summarizing IV ’s strategy
s∗IV |∅ =

pIV >
c
α
+ pDGC for Π
M
IV (pIV ) ≤ ΠD∗IV
pIV =
c
α
+ pDGC for Π
M
IV (pIV ) > Π
D∗
IV ,
(6.6)
is a subgame perfect equilibrium. IV cannot benefit by deviating from s∗IV |∅ within
this subgame.
Compared to the application game A we see that CBCL is at a disadvantage. For
A this price either equals or is lower than in this setting C. The reason lies within
the early identification and decision to pursue CL. GC does not need to apply for
compulsory licensing and takes the decision as given.
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6.3. Conclusion
The previous chapters dealt with isolated aspects of compulsory licensing (CL) such
as the duopoly pricing rational (3), incentives for research (4) or the aspect of nego-
tiations (5). In this chapter we bring the findings from these chapters together and
examine them against the background of an open economy.
Chapter 5 showed that CL is more likely to be issued for diseases predominantly af-
fecting the poor while at the same time we know that in particular these diseases are
lacking private investment in research and development (R&D). Not only might gov-
ernment’s preferences be time-inconsistent id est encouraging innovation prior to and
striving for cost effective access after the invention in a closed economy. Additionally,
developing nations all together face a free-rider dilemma in encouraging investments
in particular regarding the usage of CL. The advanced market commitment (AMC)
mechanism introduced in chapter 4 could be one solution to approach this dilemma
for specific diseases. Further, we describe how differential pricing is hampered by
reference price systems as well as parallel trade. In the same way these two topics
influence the innovator’s willingness to price discriminate between countries, both
disencourage innovators to slash prices during CL negotiations. The costs to an
innovator induced by discounts based on parallel trade and reference price systems
become relatively high compared to the market value of least developed countries
(LDC). Accordingly LDCs are at a disadvantage negotiating with innovators about
discounts prior to CL.
Compulsory licensing in the context of open economy is either domestic CL (DCL),
import CL (ICL) or cross border compulsory licensing (CBCL). For CBCL both,
the importer and the exporter are required to issue CL. For ICL as well as CBCL
transportation costs would add to the production costs of a drug. These impact
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the optimal price from the generic manufacturer’s point of view directly as well as
indirectly by means of a royalty based on sales.
From chapter 5 we know that this optimal price could be overwritten by the generic
manufacturer applying for CL with an application price. For CBCL however, the
sequence of moves in the negotiation game differs and the generic competitor does
not apply for CL. LDCs intending to issue CL have to self identify at an early stage
and trigger the costs of compulsory licensing prior to negotiations with a generic
competitor. This means that negotiations with IV and GC are not taking place
at the same time and more importantly the government commits to CL. A generic
competitor will thus set the optimal duopoly price and is not tempted to grand
discounts to convince the government of CL in the first place. LDCs anticipate this
behavior and as a result could decide to refrain from CL even though it would be
beneficial to do so from the government’s as well as the generic competitor’s point
of view.
Summarizing, LDCs are subject to several discriminations with regard to compulsory
licensing. First, LDCs are not able to benefit from negotiation with generic manu-
facturers as they commit to CL before these take place. Second, the optimal price a
generic manufacturer would choose is higher than compared to domestic production.
Transportation costs directly add to the optimal duopoly price while additionally
a royalty based on sales amplifies this effect. Third, the innovator’s willingness to
grant discounts during negotiations prior to CL is hampered. LDCs offer relative low
revenue savings compared to the global costs in terms of parallel trade and reference
price systems.
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7. Summary, critique and further
research
The work at hand presents one main finding which derives from a combination of
multiple results throughout the analysis. Least developed countries (LDC) not ca-
pable of appropriate domestic drug production are not able to fully benefit from
compulsory licenses (CL) because they are unintentionally discriminated compared
to countries with domestic production capabilities. This discrimination is hidden
within the mechanics induced by the instrument. While cross border compulsory
licensing (CBCL) is allowed under the World Trade Organization’s regime of ”Trips
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights”, the barriers to CL identified in the
literature to date lack any specifics regarding LDCs.
The reason for the discrimination is that governments (G) striving for CBCL have
to self identify at an early stage and reach out to generic manufacturers in other
countries. Between the negotiations with a patent holder, self identification, first
negotiations with a generic manufacturer, CLs in both exporting and importing
country and a final contract lies a long and cumbersome registration process. Yet, for
domestic compulsory licensing (DCL) a generic competitor (GC) takes the initiative
and files a request for CL. Not only does this give G an opportunity to fully assess the
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implications before self identifying. Additionally, this sequence forces GC to apply
with a tempting price. Countries with government owned generic manufacturers are
also able to assess the situation without self identifying early and achieve generic
prices at marginal costs.
These differences between DCL and CBCL would not lead to a discrimination if it
was not for the following two factors making the negotiations prior to a CL crucial.
Firstly, the competition that unfolds after a CL is not perfect. Because of the inno-
vator’s (IV) quality advantage and a wider distribution network of GC the generic
price will not be at marginal costs level. Additionally, a remuneration by net sales
does further increase the generic optimal duopoly price. This effect is amplified by
the production costs and increased for CBCL by transportation costs. The optimal
duopoly price however is annulled by negotiations prior to DCL. For CBCL, G com-
mits to CL prior to negotiations with GC and as a result the higher generic optimal
duopoly price applies.
Secondly, there are costs of CL which the respective government has to consider.
These costs include negative factors such as pressure from other nations and a po-
tential reduction of foreign direct investment due to perceived weakened intellectual
property protection. In order to convince the government of CL a generic competitor
thus has to further decrease the price and undercut the discounted innovator’s offer
as well as the costs of compulsory licensing. For LDC requiring CBCL these costs
are triggered when self identifying at an early stage and rejecting IVs discount offer.
Summarizing, LDCs might refrain from CL even though it would be beneficial for
both, G as well as the GC to have a CL in place. It is only due to the sequence
of moves that GC decides to price at optimal duopoly competition level if CL is
issued. Importantly, any other strategy is an empty promise. This price, however,
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is anticipated by G and might not be sufficient to issue CL in the first place, given
the costs of CL.
In order to encourage foreign generic manufacturers to reach out to LDC and apply
for compulsory licensing the export CL needs to be automatic rather than intranspar-
ent, time consuming and cumbersome. This is important not to reduce the duration
of the process per se, but to give the LDC a better position in negotiations and en-
courage generic manufacturers to reach out. Another option is for LDCs to consider
multiple compulsory licenses ab initio and assume marginal cost pricing as a result
from several GCs. This, however, is feasible only for least developed countries with
multiple domestic distributers.
A topic to consider in further research is the relation between domestic distributer
and exporting manufacturer, since in this analysis we assumed the distributer to be a
mere distribution extension of the exporter. Also, for the line of arguments presented
here the specifics of the duopoly resulting from CL are negligible. Nonetheless, fur-
ther research on the compulsory licensing duopoly could test the two dimensional
demand model and narrow down characteristics. This would be beneficial in partic-
ular with regard to neglected diseases as well as voluntary licensing and monopoly
profits. Apart from other reasons this topic is complex and interesting due to phar-
macovigilance hurdles. In addition, we assume the costs of compulsory licensing to
be public knowledge in order to simplify the analysis. Yet, it might be more accu-
rate to understand the costs as an unknown of which IV and GC form expectations.
Auxiliary, an issued CL could be interpreted as a signal influencing the expectations
of other investors and denoting the costs of CL, in terms of hampered foreign direct
investment.
Another result is that compulsory licensing is in particular likely for diseases pre-
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dominantly affecting the poor population, neglected diseases. If a CL is issued the
induced competition will improve access due to low price generics. The govern-
ment’s decision is assumed to be driven by cost savings under full supply, mirroring
this access width. This might lead to the inappropriate situation in which developing
countries avoid CL for global diseases and issue CL for neglected diseases. Yet, from
the perspective of developing countries as a united entity it would be more benefi-
cial to allocate resources just the other way around, to free-ride on global disease
research and to encourage investment in neglected diseases. As a solution, so called
Advanced Market Commitments could be used to assure time consistent incentives.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Details on Compulsory Licensing Assessment
Table 2.1 chronologically details a collection of compulsory licensing episodes based
on Beall and Kuhn (2012b). It is non-exclusive since generally, CL is not obligatory
to WTO notifications. To qualify for the list the respective government has to show
support and a mere application for CL or threat from a generic manufacturer does
not suffice. Further the involved country has to be a WTO member for the CL to
be listed. Accordingly, CL episodes from Cameroon and Eritrea are not taken into
consideration. The differences to Beall and Kuhn (2012b) are as follows:
1. Additional information on royalty rates, affected molecule and corporation as
well as the generic manufacturer have been added, if reliable sources are avail-
able. These numerous sources are given in the columns S1-S4 via characters
assigned to a source in the tables description.
2. Table 2.1 gives each affected molecule separately, whereas Beall and Kuhn
(2012b) display episodes. Thereby, the impact of episodes that affect several
corporations can be assessed at a glance. The only exception are the CL
episodes in Zimbabwe and Ghana (rows 4 & 26, respectively) which issued CLs
on all medications related to HIV and thus are difficult to assess.
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3. In order to focus on developing countries only, CL episodes in high income
countries are not considered.
4. Five episodes have been added to the list:
a) One new CL which was issues in the first quarter of 2012 by India (row
43) after Beall and Kuhn (2012b) was published (Government of India
(2012)).
b) Another episode of CL in Malaysia (row 42) which has no outcome yet,
but is considered by the government since 2010 already (Government of
India (2012)).
c) Two additional episodes in Brazil (rows 30 & 38) are added as these are
not renewals but rather renegotiations due to a additional and subsequent
CL threats (Wetzler and Ayala (2008)).
d) One additional CL was issued by Indonesia as World Health Organization
(2008) and Intellectual Property Watch (2007) explain.
5. An Indian CL episode 2006-2007 on a cancer drug for export to Nepal was
omitted since no government support from the Nepal side was reported.
6. In this list the World Bank income categorization is used rather than a mixture
of World Bank and WTO classifications (World Bank Group (2012)). These
are grouped according to 2011 gross national income per capita, for comparison
converted by the ”World Bank Atlas Method”:
a) LIE: Low-income economies ($1,025 or less),
b) LMIE: Lower-middle-income economies ($1,026 to $4,035) and
c) UMIE: Upper-middle-income economies ($4,036 to $12,475).
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Figure A.1.: Complete list of compulsory licensing episodes (additional information)
The sources for the table are: a→ Beall and Kuhn (2012a)‖b→ Saez (2010)‖c→Wetzler and
Ayala (2008)‖d→Wetzler and Palmedo (2008)‖e→ Government of India (2012)‖f→World
Health Organization (2008)‖g→ Intellectual Property Watch (2007)‖h→ Government of
Ghana (2005)‖i→ Government of Zambia (2004)‖j→ Government of Malaysia (2003)‖k→
World Health Organization (2010b)‖l→ World Bank Group (2012)‖m→ Love (2004)‖n→
Baker et al. (2008)‖o→ Silverman (2012).
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A.2. Excerpt: Agreement on Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights
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Source: World Trade Organization (1994)
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A.3. Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public
Health
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Source: World Trade Organization (2003)
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